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INTRODUCTION
The environment is a public good.I Everyday, decisions about its use,
and perhaps abuse, are made.' The resolution of most environmental
problems requires an understanding of how the environment affects human
hc.alth.3 To facilitate that understanding, the effects on human health
associated with environmental conditions are analyzed under a process
See Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental
Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 53 (1996). See generally
Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027,
1046 (1990); David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 168 (1995).
2 Environmental decisions encompass a wide variety of issues and concerns. Examples
include the permitting process, see, e.g., Gloria S. McGregor, Permitting of Hazardous
Waste Management Facilities in California, 116 J. URB. PLAN. & DEV. 1, 2 (1990); siting
of hazardous waste facilities, Intense Public Opposition, Unrealistic Schedules Called
Reasons New York Could Not Site Facility, 27 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 833 (Aug. 9,
1996); James F. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating
Community Perceptions Into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 547,
547 (1994); alternative actions addressed in an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), 42
U.S.C. § 553 (1994); level of risk that is acceptable at a Superfund site, John S. Applegate,
A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental
Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1653-54 (1995) (addressing whether a site
constitutes a level of contamination sufficient to qualify as a Superfund site); or agency
rulemaking, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Let's Make a Deal, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1997, at 42
(analyzing the adverse human health effects associated with Brownfields); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (b)(1)(1994);
see also Paul R. Portney, Introduction to PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
2 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); Thomas A.W. Miller & Edward B. Keller, What the Public
Thinks, E.P.A.J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 40, 42 (1991); see also infra note 32 and accompanying
text.
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known as "risk assessment."4 The risk assessment process involves four
steps: hazard identification, dose response assessment, exposure assessment,
and risk characterization.5
4 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL / NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983) [hereinafter
RED BOOK] ("Risk assessment is the use of the factual base to define the health effects of
exposure of individuals or populations to hazardous materials and situations."). RED BOOK
procedure of quantitative risk assessment ("QRA") is the currently accepted methodology for
risk assessments. See Paul A. Locke, Reorienting Risk Assessment, Research Brief No. 4,
8 (1994). President Clinton's administration has supported the use of QRA. See Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). While most
government agencies use risk assessment in the regulatory process, see Locke, supra at 8,
"risk assessment" is not a term used in our environmental statutes, see Mark Eliot Shere, The
Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. J. 409, 420 (1995);
Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Trying to Understand
the Process, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 47 (1991); Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 273 (1992), with the
exception of a reference in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. For a good overview
of the history of risk assessment, see Dennis J. Paustenbach, Health Risk Assessments..
Opportunities and Pitfalls, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 379, 380-82 (1989). The recently
amended Food Quality Protection act specifically calls for risk assessment. See 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 1-800 (Supp. I. 1997). The EPA has been using QRA since 1976. See Robert W. Collin,
Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and
Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121, 158 (1994) (citing SOCIAL THEORIES OF
RISK (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). There are alternative processes to
Red Book-type risk assessment. See generally PETER MONTAGUE, ENVIRONMENTAL
RESEARCH FOUNDATION QUESTIONS TO ASK ABOUT RISK ASSESSMENT 7-8 (1993); KRISTIN
S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY 186-88 (1991) (advocating the use of
diverse risk analyses simultaneously). Qualitative risk assessments also have been used in
public decisionmaking. See, e.g., Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Racism
and Biased Methods of Risk Assessment, 7 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENv'T, Winter 1996, at
72. For a brief history of the risk assessment, see John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced,
3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REV. 382, 386-88 (1995).
5 See RED BOOK, supra note 4, at 3. As explained by Robert A. Pollak:
Risk identification is the starting point: a substance such as formaldehyde
is suspected of causing adverse health effects, for example, lung cancer,
nasal cancer, leukemia, and brain cancer. Dose-response assessment
estimates the relationship between the amount, intensity, or duration of
exposure and the risk of a particular outcome: for example, the
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Risk assessment methodology seems scientific, and therefore beyond
the pale of lay questioning.6 If the risk assessment were completely
scientific, public input in the risk assessment process would be very limited
and uncontroversial. That, however, is not the case. Individually, risk
assessment and public participation are the subject of heated debates.
Together, they may prove explosive. This article focuses on the intersection
of risk assessment and public participation.7 The extent to which citizens'
relationship between the airborne concentration of formaldehyde in the
workplace and a worker's lifetime probability of contracting leukemia.
Exposure assessment might measure airborne concentration or the dose
delivered to or absorbed by workers. Risk characterization combines
dose-response assessment and exposure assessment to obtain a summary
measure of the impact of a substance on human health.
Robert A. Pollak, Government Risk Regulation, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
25, 26 (1996).
6 See generally Stephen Dycus, NEPA Secrets, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 301 (1993)
(arguing that "expertocracy" has been given power over environmental decisionmaking); Erin
K.L. Mahaney, Assessing the Fitness of Novel Scientific Evidence in the Post-Daubert Era:
Pesticide Exposure Cases as a Paradigm for Determining Admissibility, 26 ENVTL. L. 1161,
1178-79 (1996) (discussing the public's acceptance of expert risk assessments).
7 "Public participation" frequently is used synonymously with the terms "public
involvement," "citizen participation" or "citizen involvement." See, e.g., John P. Plumee et
al., Citizen Participation in Water Quality Planning, 16 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 455, 471 n.2
(1985); Judy B. Rosener, Citizen Participation: Can We Measure Its Effectiveness?, 38 PUB.
ADMIN. 457, 457-58 (1978). For the purposes of this article, these terms are being used
interchangeably, with the acknowledgment that they are arguably semantically distinct. See
Stuart Langton, What is Citizen Participation?, in PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON
THE STATE OF THE ART 20, 20-21 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (drawing distinctions between
the definitions of public participation, citizen participation, political participation, and citizen
involvement).
Public participation is a form of political participation. "Political participation" has
been defined broadly as "any attempt to influence what government does." WALTER J.
STONE, REPUBLIC AT RISK: SELF-INTEREST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 27 (1989). As used in this
article, "public participation" is any activity which is, in fact, public, for the purpose of
achieving politically-acceptable or legitimate public-policy decisions. I use the term to
indicate any non-violent action or vocalization by a member of the public (someone other
than a scientist, technician, or bureaucrat speaking on behalf of the government) directed
toward or involved in a public environmental decisionmaking process. Public participation
commonly includes commenting about permit applications and involvement in lawsuits for
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may participate in the risk assessment process and environmental
decisionmaking generally is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act
environmental enforcement of damages caused by alterations to the natural environment. See
Merry Goodenough, Public Participation in a State-Assumed Wetlands Permit Program:
The Michigan Example, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 221, 239-50 (1995). Other forms of
political involvement include political party activism and protests. See Holly A. Heyser, New
Wave of Civic Activism Invigorating, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Oct. 20, 1996, at 8B.
Increasingly, citizen advisory committees and membership on advisory boards have become
popular forms of public participation. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD,
WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FEARNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 131 (1994);
Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional
Mechanisms, 15 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 226, 230-35 (1990). For a more extensive list
of public participation mechanisms, see Table 9-1, Technique/Function Matrix and
Descriptions, in PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA, supra at 117 (listing dozens of public
participation methods); J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 89 n.78 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et
al. eds., 1993) (citing ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 61-97 (1979)).
' The main participants in the risk assessment process are scientists (including biologists
and biochemists, botanists, chemists, ecologists, entomologists, epidemiologists, geneticists,
geologists, horticulturalists, hydrologists, limnologists, physicians, meteorologists,
oceanographists, physicists, and toxicologists) and engineers or other experts, elected
officials, bureaucrats, and citizens. An illustrative case study involving some of these players
is found in Luther P. Gerlach, Crises Are for Using: The 1988 Drought in Minnesota, 15
ENVTL. PROF. 274, 274-86 (1993). Throughout this article "citizens" also are referred to as
"the public." This assumes a homogeneous "public," an heuristic abstraction. Simply, but
accurately stated: "There is no single public." Adam N. Bram, Note & Comment, Public
Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute to Environmental Injustice, 5 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 145, 149 (1996) (citation omitted). However, other scholars have made
use of the phrase "the public" for academic purposes. See Sarah Lichenstein et al., When
Lives Are in Your Hands: Dilemmas of a Societal Decision Maker, in INSIGHTS IN DECISION
MAKING: A TRIBUTE TO HILLEL J. EINHORN 91, 94 (Robin Hogarth ed., 1990) (recognizing
that the term "public" is an abstract term: "the public rarely speaks with one voice"). Beyond
the scope of this article is an analysis of who or what constitutes a relevant public,
community, or stakeholder. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 594-97, 638-48 (1996); Georgette C. Poindexter,
Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfields Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to
Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 66 (1995) (arguing stakeholders are those who
have a relevant interest in the environmental controversy at issue).
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("APA"),9 as well as many environmental statutes.'0 In Part I of this article,
the rights established by public participation law are reviewed.
As explored throughout this article, citizen participation is endemic
to American political culture." Although codification of public participation
law is relatively recent, public involvement in governing can be traced to the
birth of the nation. 12 Prior to World War II, citizen participation largely was
limited to voting, holding public office, and service in community groups. 3
The creation of the administrative state in the 1930s New Deal legislation 4
9 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994). The APA includes the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), and the Government in the Sunshine Act and general
requirements for agency rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 552b-(1994).
10 See infra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
See Fiorino, supra note 7, at 227-28; Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways:
Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 463, 480-83 (1989).
Public participation is largely an American phenomenon. See SHEILA JASANOFF,
RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 15 (1986); Michael S. Baram, Corporate Risk
Management and Risk Communication in the European Community and the United States,
2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 99 (1989); Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and the
Political Acknowledgment of Risk, 119 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T, Fall 1990, at 61.
See generally Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science and
Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 343, 348-49 (1989) (discussing European decisionmaking
exclusively involving experts); Sheila Jasanoff, Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in
Britain and the United States, in THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 30, 32
(B.B. Johnson & V.T. Covello eds., 1987).
12 See Jan C. McAlpine & Pat LaDonne, The United States Government, Public
Participation, and Trade and Environment, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 203, 209
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (discussing President George Washington's efforts to
elicit public input); Owen Olpin, Toward Jeffersonian Governance of the Public Lands, 27
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 959, 960 (1994) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's concerns over the lack
of public input in drafting of the Constitution).
"3 See Carl W. Stenberg, Citizens and the Administrative State: From Participation to
Power, PUB. ADMIN. REV., May-June 1972, at 191 (noting interest in public participation
rose as public confidence in administrative agencies and expert decisionmaking declined);
see also DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE, AMERICA'S
ToxIcs POLICY FOR THE 1990'S 185-86 (1992).
'4 See VICTOR B. SCHEFFER, THE SHAPING OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICA 3-4 (1992);
see also APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
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heralded expanded citizen participation. 5 In the 1970s16 our major
environmental laws were enacted incorporating public participation rights.17
In Part 1I, the purpose of citizen input in environmental decisionmaking is
discussed more thoroughly. The future of public participation rights is in
flux. Proponents of public participation span an array of interests. On one
"S For a good overview of the historical development of citizen participation as part of the
administrative state, see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of
Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981,
1004-07 (1994); Stenberg, supra note 13, at 190.
6 The birth of contemporary environmental regulation occurred in the 1960s and 1970s,
beginning with what many consider to be the first major environmental protection statute, the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994). See
Donald W. Stever, Experience and Lessons of Twenty-Five Years of Environmental Law:
Where We Have Been and Where We Are Headed, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1994).
For a concise, yet solid overview of the major environmental laws passed during this period,
see J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional
Responsibility, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 825, 827-28 (1994).
7 The rise in environmental consciousness has been well documented. See generally
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990). Many refer to the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
as the catalyst for contemporary environmental awareness. See, e.g., MARK DowlE, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 21
(1995). During the 1970s the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was created and
the major backbone of American environmental laws were passed. See Mimi Larsen Becker,
The International Joint Commission and Public Participation: Past Experiences, Present
Challenges, Future Tasks, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 235, 240 (1993); Ray A. MacNair et al.,
Citizen Participation in Public Bureaucracies, 14 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 507, 507 (1983) (noting
the rise in public participation requirements in the 1970s); Paul R. Portney, EPA and the
Evolution of Federal Regulation, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra note 3, at 1, 7-8. The EPA was created as part of the reorganization plan of 1970, 5
U.S.C. Reorg. Plan of 1970 No.3, App. 1 (1988), pursuant to the Reorganization Act of
1949, then codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-913 (1970). Some scholars link the rise of public
participation in environmental decisionmaking with the political changes of the 1960s. See,
e.g., J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 33-34; Plater, supra note 15, at 1004.
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end of the spectrum are anti-litigation proponents,18 accompanied by those
advocating decentralization.19 On the other end are lawyers2 ° and
environmental activists,2 including members of the Environmental Justice
movement." As diverse as their interests may appear, however, these players
coalesce around the common theme of protecting, and in some cases
enhancing, public participation rights. Today, public participation law is
"s See Cooperation, Participation Hallmarks of New 'E' Age, AIR/WATER POLLUTION
REP., June 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10835655; Risk Assessment. NRC Panel Says
More Involvement by Public Would Help Curb Litigation, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
133, at DI I (June 12, 1996). In addressing the Air and Waste Management Association's
89th Annual meeting, the Chair/CEO of Eastman Chemical Co., Earnie Davenport,
emphasized the growing significance of public participation in environmental
decisionmaking and resolution. See id.
'9 See Elaine Hiruo, Howdy Neighbor, 38 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 1;
Waste Management Cleanup Moves Toward Decentralization With Push for Public Say in
Decisions, 18 NUCLEAR FUEL, Mar. 29, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2421918.
20 See 142 CONG. REc. S6160-61 (daily ed. June 12, 1996) (recommendation by A.B.A.,
Standing Committee on Environmental Law; Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory
Practice; Section of Natural Resources, Energy & Environmental Law).
21 See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, R.I. Green Party Chooses Candidates Before Sparse
Crowd, June 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5390608; Federal Facilities: Report on
Cleanup Process Expected as Dialogue Group Rushes Out Final Report, Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at D16 (June 30, 1996); see also Heyser, supra note 7, at 8B.
22 See, e.g., Bram, supra note 8, at 147-48; Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA 's in the
Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 565, 565, 572, 600 (1997) (minority
and low-income communities denied meaningful participation); Robert R. Kuehn, The
Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv.
103, 160-61 (early, full, and meaningful participation necessary); Poindexter, supra note 8,
at 59 ("[A] new decision-making model must be developed that allows the voice of all
interested parties to be heard at the decision-making table."); see also Charles Lee,
Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A Paradigm for Achieving Healthy and
Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL L.J. 571, 571 (1995). In 1994, President William
Clinton signed an Executive Order requiring the incorporation of Environmental Justice
concerns into federal environmental and housing decisions. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3
C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1994); see also Executive Order
on Environmental Justice Calls on U.S. Agencies to Develop Strategies, 29 ENV'T REP.
1770, 1770 (1994). For a general overview of the Environmental Justice movement see
DOWIE, supra note 17, at 140-57; Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and
Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, I I VA. ENVTL L.J. 495, 495-97 (1992).
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slated for revision.23 Part III, contains suggestions for public participation
law reform.
This article is not intended as an exegesis on risk assessment and
public participation, but is written in the hope that some questions about
public participation in the twenty-first century will be raised for future debate
and dialogue. Our societal milieu hosts two potent forces: increasing
demands for democratic reform,24 matched only by rapid advances in science
and technology. 25 Importantly, demands for environmental quality face
budgetary restraints.26 Questions about how and the extent to which the
public should participate in the risk assessment process will only become
more significant as we move into the next century. Proponents of public
participation in environmental decisionmaking contend that:
a substantial shift toward much greater and more effective
participation by all affected interests is needed in the political
process and in modes of public-private interactions.
Unfortunately, to accomplish that result may require a shock
to the system similar to the one Three Mile Island caused in
23 See, e.g., Rangelands Management Act, S. 1459; Accelerated Cleanup and Environ-
mental Restoration Act, S. 2689-01; Senate Environment and Public Works Committee GOP
Side Discussion Draft of CERCLA Reform Legislation, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at
D35 (March 21, 1996); see also Risk Assessment Improvement Act, Risk Communication
Act, the Environmental Technologies Act of 1994, and the Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit
Act of 1995, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), 141 CONG. REC. H2372.
24 See generally Stephen C. Craig, The Angry Voter: Politics and Popular Discontent in
the 1990s, in BROKEN CONTRACT? CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AMERICANS AND
THEIR GOVERNMENT 46, 46-51 (Stephen C. Craig ed., 1996) (reviewing contemporary
history of American dissatisfaction with government).
25 See David Dickson, Limiting Democracy: Technocrats and the Liberal State, 1
DEMOCRACY 61, 63 (1980) ("For much of the twentieth century, technology and the liberal
state have appeared the perfect couple; today they seem candidates for divorce."); see also
Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton, Citizen Participation and Technology, in CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 3, 5 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987)
(discussing technology and democracy at odds).
26 See Bill McMahon, Study: Voters Want More Environmental Protection, BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Apr. 7, 1997, at 1.
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nuclear power.27
In contrast, others advocate limiting public participation. To date, legal
scholars have only operated on the periphery of this debate, which concerns,
at its core, a legal issue:" To what extent should citizens participate in
environmental decisionmaking, who should participate, and what rules and
institutions foster public participation?"
I. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION LAW
While the term "risk assessment" generally does not appear in our
environmental statutes, 31 most environmental laws require an analysis of the
adverse effects on human health caused by degradation of the natural
environment.32 In turn, environmental statutes, the Administrative Procedure
27 MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 20-2 1; see also A.B.A., supra note 20, at
S6160-61.
21 See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
29 See A.B.A., supra note 20, at S6160-6 1; Richard 0. Brooks, A New Agenda for Modem
Environmental Law, 6 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 22-24 (1991) (noting the need for public
participation and lawyers trained in the art of citizens' participatory rights); David H.
Rosenbloom, The Evolution of the Administrative State and Transformations of
Administrative Law, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3, 33 (David
H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994) (arguing that understanding of public
participation needs further research).
30 To the extent legal scholars study public participation, it tends to be limited to mandated
administrative processes. Public participation prior to the notice and comment period, or
alternatives to notice and comment participation, receive little attention. See Brooks, supra
note 29, at 36 (calling for increased legal scholarship in citizen participation); Eileen Gay
Jones, Nights at the Roundtable: Public Participation Joins the Battle Against Cold-War
Waste, FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 1997) (case study of early public participation).
"' See supra note 4.
32 See supra note 3; see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y, 136bb & 136(a)(c) (1994) (regulating risks to humans posed by pesticides);
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-393, 348(c)(3)(A) (1994) (food must be "safe" for human consumption);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Safe Drinking Water
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Act33 ("APA"), and their accompanying regulations incorporate citizen
involvement provisions.34 Other agency policy documents 35 and executive
orders36 also govern public participation. As questions over waste
management and hazardous waste sitings predominate the environmental
agenda, the public participation requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act37 ("RCRA") and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 38 ("CERCLA") are highlighted
in this article. Public participation issues in the National Environmental
Policy Act39 ("NEPA") are also considered.40
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(0 to 3000)-26 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1994), as amended by Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
33 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
14 See, e.g., E.P.A., COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN SUPERFUND: A HANDBOOK 7-12 (1992).
3 See id.
36 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
(West 1994) (promoting public participation); see also supra note 22.
"7 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
38 Id. §§ 9601-9675.
39 Id. §§ 4321-4370d.
40 Public participation requirements also are included in other statutes. See, e.g., Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1972); Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform
Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 226(0 (1986) (public participation required before issuance of a lease of
public lands); Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1994) and its regulations, 33
C.F.R. § 327.4(a) (1996); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356
(1994) (1978 amendments enhanced rights to public participation). Grant programs include
public participation as well. See, e.g., Construction Grants for Waste Water Treatment
Works, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1994), 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.917-5, 105 (1996); Water Pollution
Control State and Inter-State Program Grants, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1994), 40 C.F.R. §§
130.10, 131.20 (1996); Water Pollution Control State and Areawide Water Quality Control
Management Planning Agency Grants, 33 U.S.C. § 1281 , 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.10, 131.201
(1996); State Public Water System Supervision Program Grants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-4, 300g-
5 (1994), 40 C.F.R. § 142.50 (1996); State Underground Water Source Protection Program
Grants, 40 C.F.R. § 35.670-4(b) (1996); Air Pollution Program Grants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-
5(a)(1) (1994), 7427, 7428, 40 C.F.R. § 35.52(0 (1996); Solid Waste Management
Demonstration Grants, 42 U.S.C. § 6944(b) (1994), 40 C.F.R. §§ 249. 1(b), 249.2 (1996);
Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Program Support, 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1994), 40
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RCRA mandates notice and opportunity for public comment on
remedial actions, permit issuances, and proposed rules and regulations.4 For
long-term, permanent remedial actions, CERCLA allows for notice and
comment of the proposed cleanup plan and any alternatives.42 This notice
and comment period follows the studies identifying and characterizing the
human health hazards posed by a contaminated site.43 The APA provides the
general notice and comment requirements for agency rulemaking." NEPA
also contains public participation requirements allowing for public comment
after preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS").45
RCRA, CERCLA, APA, and NEPA, however, have large public
participation gaps. Any gap in substantive law leaves a corresponding public
participation void. For example, the petroleum exclusion under CERCLA
effectively bars citizen input on that subject.46 In other instances, public
participation simply is not authorized. CERCLA does not provide
meaningful public participation if an emergency response (a/k/a "removal")
C.F.R. § 249.1(b) (1996).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 7004; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-25.14, 124.17 (1996).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a). The agency must "respond," although not necessarily follow
the public's input. See id. § 9617(b). Removal actions may be completed prior to public
participation and consideration of public input. See id. § 9617; see also id.
§ 9613(k)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (providing notice and comment period for remedial plans).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (requiring public participation after Remedial Investigation /
Feasibility ("RI/FS") studies).
44 See 5 U.S.C. Ch. 5 (1994).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 553 (1994); see also regulations promulgated by the Council on Env-
ironmental Quality ("CEQ"). These regulations provide the notice and comment rules for
public participation in a decision regarding federal actions. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b),
1500.2(d), 1503. l(a)(4), 1506.6 (1996).
46 See Roger Armstrong, Comment, CERCLA 's Petroleum Exclusion: Bad Policy for a
Problematic Statute, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1157, 1158-59 (1994); see also John C.
Dembach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 1, 65 (1997) (failure to regulate chemicals).
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is undertaken,47 because any opportunity to provide input is ex post facto. In
the case of remedial actions, the public is excluded from the remedial
investigation/feasibility stage." At this stage, risk assessments and
engineering studies are performed determining the agency's preferences
regarding the course of treatment for a Superfund site. Thus, critical
decisions such as ascertaining the population at risk, or the methodology for
estimating risk probabilities are determined by bureaucrats, and scientific,
technical, or medical experts.
Public participation under RCRA excludes the public until a permit
application or modification hearing,49 essentially adopting the decide-
announce-and-defend approach to public participation originally established
by the APA.5° Prior to the hearing stage, the applicant must prepare its
application, containing various risk and technical information.5 This
includes, for instance, a map characterizing local land-use52 as well as
emergency response and evaluation procedures53 This information depends
on making assumptions and inferences, and gathering data. In the process,
the researchers or experts must make judgments which may or may not
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (1994) (limiting public participation to proposed remedial action
plans). "Because removals deal with the near-term, and remedies deal with the long-term,
different procedures apply to each. Generally, the selection of a remedy takes longer than
the selection of a removal, and involves more Agency deliberation and public participation."
In re: TH Agriculture & Nutrition Co., No. 94-20, 1996 WL 514290, at * 3 (U.S.E.P.A. Sept.
5, 1996); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 53
Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,463 ("Because the nature of removal actions often involves the need
for prompt action, the procedures today for public participation in removal actions are quite
different from those for remedial actions.").
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (requiring remedial investigation/feasibility studies ("RIIFS") for
all remedial action plans); id. § 9617 (public participation after RI/FS stage for remedial
actions).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (1994); 40 C.F.R. pt. 124, subpt. A (1996) (delineating specific
public participation requirements under RCRA).
50 See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
" See 40 C.F.R. § 270 (1996)
52 See id. § 270.14(b)(19).
" See id. § 270.14(a)(8)-(l0).
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reflect public sentiment. In essence, the agency "defines the agenda."54 The
agency chooses the "game," the public "plays" in the last inning, at best.
Other gaps in RCRA55 and CERCLA56 coverage have been
documented and debated in a large body of literature and need not be
reproduced here. 7 In the case of NEPA, an agency determination that an EIS
is not required58 precludes mandated public involvement. 9 Similarly,
limiting NEPA to "major federal actions"6 leaves private matters or non-
major activities outside NEPA's purview.6 The APA, in essence, limits
access to non-classified and de-classified materials,62 and mandates only
minimal process requirements for agency hearings on proposed rules,63 and
" See Activists Push for More Input to Aim's Accelerated Cleanup, 4 ENVTL. REMEDIA-
TION TECH. 151, 159 (1996).
" See Armstrong, supra note 46, at 1169-70 (discussing the petroleum exclusion); Daniel
A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 791,
796-97 (1994); John-Mark Stensvaag, The Not So Fine Print of Environmental Law, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1093, 1094-96 (1994).
56 See id.
17 See id.
58 See40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1996).
'9 See id. § 1501.4(e). The public is involved in the Environmental Assessment ("EA")
process to a more limited extent than in the case of preparation of an EIS. See id. § 1506.6.
Also, an EIS may be exempt from disclosure in the interest of national security. See
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (explaining that public
disclosure is pre-empted by national defense exemption to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)). See
generally Dycus, supra note 6, at 300-02; William Murray Tabb, The Role of Controversy
in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 175, 176-85 (1997).
42 U.S.C. § 1501.7 (1994). The corresponding CEQ regulations are found at C.F.R. §§
1508.3, 1508.14, 1508.18, 1508.27 (1996).
6 For further discussion of the limits of NEPA see Johnson, supra note 22, at 588-98.
62 See FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1994) (excluding national defense and foreign policy
documents from public purview). See Allan Robert Adler, Public Access to Nuclear Energy
and Weapons Information, in CONTROLLING THE ATOM IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 73, 77 (David
O'Very et al. eds., 1994).
63 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1994).
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other non-rulemaking activities. 6
The 104th Congress considered a number of environmental bills with
diverse requirements for public participation," passing none of them into law.
The 105th Congress renewed the prospect of regulatory reform. The tenor
of the debate in Congress portends a future for public participation
requirements, and not the complete abandonment of participation
requirements.66
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Law shapes society.67 Public participation law is designed to serve
both specific functions in the environmental decisionmaking process, e.g.,
facilitating the siting of a hazardous waste facility,68 and more abstract
4 Section 553 exempts the following activities from notice and comment requirements:
interpretive rules, policy statements, procedural rules, and impractical notice and comment
procedures. "To avoid overseers, EPA has increasingly resorted to less formal means of
announcing agency policy determinations. Instead of promulgating rules pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, EPA now frequently issues guidance memoranda and
directives." Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 356 (citation omitted).
65 See, e.g., Grazing bill, S. 1459 (1996), Takings bill, S. 605 (1995), Wetlands bill, S.
1662 (1996), Regulatory reform bills, H.R. 2036, H.R. 3077 and S. 582 (1996).
66 See supra note 23.
" See generally BENJAMIN CoRDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)
(classic jurisprudence on the function of American law).
68 See, e.g., Albert R. Matheny & Bruce A. Williams, Knowledge v. NIMBY: Assessing
Florida's Strategy for Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 74 POL'Y STUD. J. 70, 72-73
(1985) (arguing the public must feel that siting is voluntary, demanding active public
participation in decisionmaking); John Charles Sassaman, Jr., Comment, Siting Without
Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting Radioactive
Waste Facilities, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 207, 208-10 (1992) (discussing the siting process
of a facility in New York). But see, e.g., MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 190-91
(stating that public participation may not enhance prospects of siting a hazardous waste
facility).
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functions, e.g., political legitimacy.69 In the absence of public participation,
judgments about the distribution of environmental amenities or effects do not
reside with those individuals and communities that will be affected most
directly by the state of the environment. 7° These putative decisionmakers are
not elected representatives responsive or accountable to the public, but
bureaucrats or agency employees.7' In turn, the public may feel the loss of
its right to govern, either directly through deliberative means or indirectly
through elected representatives.72 At a minimum, the demands of American
political culture require public confirmation of agency discretion. 73 Recent
thought concedes that the announce-and-defend procedure does not provide
sufficient public input. 74 The minimum standard established by the procedure
has been resisted in favor of earlier, more frequent, and significant direct
69 Administrative agencies are not enumerated in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 1. Many commentators have noted the legitimacy problem of administrative agencies.
See, e.g., Donald A. Brown, Superfund Cleanups, Ethics, and Environmental Risk
Assessment, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 181, 192-96 (1988); Deeohn Ferris,
Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in
the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 674-77 (1994); Andreas
Teuber, Justifying Risk, DADALUS, Fall 1990, at 249.
70 See Miller & Keller, supra note 3, at 42. See generally GLEN G. ROBINSON, AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, 69-80 (1991).
" See Frances M. Lynn, The Interplay of Science and Values in Assessing and Regulating
Environmental Risks, 11 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 40, 48 (1986) (arguing against the use
of scientific advisory boards because they exclude public input); Rosenthal et al., supra note
4, at 339. See generally Kuehn, supra note 22, at 160-66 (discussing reform of exclusionary
risk assessment processes).
72 See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 3
(1990) (describing agencies as the "fourth branch" of government); DAVID MATHEWS,
POLITICS FOR PEOPLE: FINDING A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC VOICE 69-70 (1994).
"3 See generally Poisner, supra note 1, at 55-63 (public must be involved in environmental
decisionmaking in the American form of democracy).
7' The announce and defend procedure is established by the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576,
701-706 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 107-19.
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public participation.75
A. Political Legitimacy
1. The Role of Affirmative Conduct
Political accountability of agencies sets the United States "apart from
the rest of the other legal systems of the world."76 In the absence of popular
support, implementation of environmental decisions may be delayed,"
" See Jack Citrin, Who's the Boss? Direct Democracy and Popular Control of Govern-
ment, in BROKEN CONTRACT? CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THEIR
GOVERNMENT, supra note 24, at 269 ("The populist spirit animates the current era in
American politics."). See generally E.P.A., supra note 34, at 88-89 (emphasizing importance
of early public participation in Superfund site decisions); Activists Push for More Input to
Alm's Accelerated Cleanup, supra note 54, at 159 (absence of public participation in drafting
stages of administrative rule gives agency power to "define the dialogue"); Applegate, supra
note 2, at 1653 (advocating early public participation).
76 Turner T. Smith, Environmental Law - Old Way and New Directions, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1077, 1082 (1994).
77 See, e.g., Anthony Barker, Expert Advice and Formal Public Involvement on Public
Policies Involving Risk, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, AND RISK 207, 217-18 (James
F. Short, Jr. & Lee Clarke eds., 1992) (discussing delays in licensing nuclear power plant in
Britain); Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 950-51 (1994);
Lazarus, supra note 64, at 352 (noting EPA's diminished credibility resulted in delays in
Superfund clean-up efforts); Mark Arner, Plans for Seaside Hotel Put Off, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., May 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2159233; Elaine Hiruo, Consensus-Building
Produces New Dawn for Public Involvement, NUCLEONICS WK., Apr. 22, 1993, at 12,
available in 1993 WL 2420988.
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undermined,78 or sometimes rendered unsustainable.79 Public participation
is proffered as a mechanism fostering political legitimacy"° and politically
viable decisions. 1 In the process, citizens receive education in civic
7" See SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 4, at 208 (examples of civil disobedience); Cross,
supra note 77, at 957; Shaul Feller & Michael Maharik, Risk Criteria for Approving or
Rejecting Field Tests of High-Performance Weapons, 7 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 305,
310 (1996) (arguing the public will oppose environmental decisions reached by "indefensible
process"); E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon. An
Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 13,340 (July, 1995) (opposition may cause delays).
" See, e.g., Intense Public Opposition, Unrealistic Schedules Called Reasons New York
Could Not Site Facility, supra note 2, at 833; see also Stephen Cotgrove, Risk, Value Conflict
and Political Legitimacy, in DEALING WITH RISK 122, 139 (Richard F. Griffiths ed., 1981)
(discussing that the loss of legitimacy may give rise to "direct action - disruption, boycotts,
sit-ins and at the extreme, violence"); SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 4, at 208 (the public
may resort to 'civil disobedience' such as sabotage or taking government officials hostage);
Susan G. Hadden, Public Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 47, 47-48
(199 1); Olpin, supra note 12, at 962.
'0 See Cotgrove, supra note 79, at 138 ("Legitimacy is more than legality. It is an
acceptance of rules and decisions as in some way proper, which ought to be kept ... it rests
in part in the belief that the procedures are fair and reasonable, that there is a genuine attempt
to pursue the public good."). For a good overview of American theories of legitimacy, see
CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS, ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 313-77 (1997). Administrative
agencies charged with making and implementing environmental decisions on a local level
have suffered from a lack of accountability and legitimacy. See Owen M. Fiss, The
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983); Matheny & Williams,
supra note 68, at 72-73.
S See Miller & Keller, supra note 3, at 42; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760-81 (1975). Support for public
participation is grounded in democratic theory; see also ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRACY 137 (1957); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARIAL DEMOCRACY 3-7
(1980); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 939-44 (1988).
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responsibility.82 If the public is excluded,83 not meaningfully involved,84 or
sectors of the public are barred from the decisionmaking process,85 legitimacy
is diminished. Yet some commentators have argued that the absence of
public participation does not undermine democratic decisionmaking because
the inactive public is not interested in the process.86 A critique of this model
of decisionmaking follows.
82 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
32 (1985).
" See Collin, supra note 4, at 160 ("If, in a democracy, the basis of policy is not perceived
as fair by the citizenry, it is not sustainable, even if it ... would lead to sustainable
practices."); James L. Regens & Robert W. Rycroft, Measuring Equity in Regulatory Policy
Implementation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423, 423 (1986) ("Parties-at-interest must be admitted
to the policy process, including both rulemaking and rule adjudication, on the basis of
procedures known in advance and applicable to all."); Teuber, supra note 69, at 247.
" See, e.g., Bemd Holznagel, Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Haz-
ardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REv. 329, 347 (1986) (involving
the public in the process after siting decision is antithetical to purpose of public
participation); Plumlee et al., supra note 7, at 455-57 (arguing that study of Texas water
quality program evidenced ineffective public participation); Holley Gilbert Corum, North
Zoner: Is Anybody Listening?, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 24, 1996, at B2 (stating that
public's suggestions ignored by planning commission); see also Poindexter, supra note 8,
at 68-70.
8 See generally Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2500 Before the
Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (1996) (testimony of
Florence T. Robinson) (residents in close proximity to Superfund site must be actively
involved in decisionmaking); see also supra note 22; cf. David L. Bazelon, Coping With
Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 826-32 (1977) (stating
that after an opportunity to air their views, public is more likely to acquiesce even if it does
not agree).
86 See generally Study Identifies Research Needs to Advance Comparative Risk, 3 RISK
POL'Y REP. 12, 12-13 (1997) (noting public apathy); infra note 89. See generally Gerald E.
Frug, Administrative Democracy, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
519, 532 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard R. Schwartz eds., 1994) (arguing against those
who contend the public is apathetic).
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2. Acquiescence is Not a Substitute for Proactive Public Participation
When the public is not involved in public environmental forums,
arguably the citizenry has acquiesced to any decisions made on its behalf.8 7
Silence, however, may not reflect satisfaction, but a feeling of
disempowerment 8 Silence may be illustrative of more practical concerns,
such as lack of energy, time, or knowledge.8 9 Nor does initial silence,
8 For a review of the critics of public participation, see Curtis Ventriss, Emerging Pers-
pectives in Citizen Participation, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 433, 435 (1985); see also MATHEWS,
supra note 72, at 72-74 (1994) (discussing interviews with public officials about citizen
apathy).
88 See Bram, supra note 8, at 155 ("citizens of low income/racial minority communities
tend to distrust solutions provided by the legal system") (citing Luke W. Cole, Empowerment
as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641, 647-48 (1992)); Gy6rgy Sz6ll, Technology, Production,
Consumption and the Environment, 13 UNESCO 217-20 (1994). Gy6rgy Sz6ll states that
feelings of disempowerment may account for what he sees as a low-level participation rate
in environmental politics, see id; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1980); Frank N. Laird, The Decline of Deference: The Political
Context of Risk Communication, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 543, 546 (1989) (finding an alienated
public tends to not participate); Sassaman, supra note 68, at 233-34; cf EDWARD C.
BANFIELD, INFLUENCE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22 (1961) (stating that efforts to affect
public decisions "will be in proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favorable
outcome multiplied by the probability of influencing the decision").
89 See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 72, at 72-73 (stating that time demands inhibit public
participation); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 647 (1992) (arguing the poor
are skeptical of legal challenges); Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City for
Environmental Justice: Lessons from the Movement, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 67,
75 (1993-1994); Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue
Skies Go? Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 446
(1994) (explaining some citizens may not be aware of public participation opportunities, or
if they are, do not believe they are worthwhile); Esty, supra note 8, at 651 (arguing
investment associated with learning scientific and technical complexities inhibit public
participation). But see Riley Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS & POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 89-134 (James 0. Lester ed.,
1989); Robert Cameroon Mitchell, Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the
1990s?, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA, supra note 17,
at 81; McMahon, supra note 26, at 1 (research indicating Americans on-going concern for
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ignorance, or apathy necessarily indicate the public will abstain from
retaliation at the implementation stage.90  At that point, the public's
perception of the decision's undesirability may be most salient.9'
Alleged acquiescence, in many cases, is no substitute for affirmative
acts that demonstrate public support for an environmental decision.92 Rather,
political legitimacy is garnered through deliberation wherein parties engage
in exchange and dialogue.93 Deliberation not only allows for the exchange
of ideas, but for the creation or discovery of communal ideas. 94 Currently,
our law and political institutions do not fully support responsible public
participation programs. Some of the institutional weaknesses relevant to
public participation are discussed below.
the environment); Spence, supra note 1, at 158 (environmental concerns remain strong). The
public's interest in environmental protection also is suggested by the lack of public support
for the 1996 GOP environmental agenda. See Special Report: Environmental Policy 1996
Outlook, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at D33 (Feb. 2, 1996).
90 See SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 4, at 208; Cotgrove, supra note 79, at 139.
9' See Susan Hadden, Citizen Participation in Environmental Policy Making, in LEARN-
ING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 91, 109 (Sheila Jasanoffed., 1994).
92 See Frug, supra note 86, at 532 (describing critics of alleged citizen apathy as having
an "antidemocratic prejudice").
"3 See Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1632-35 (1985).
"4 See id. One primary purpose of public participation is to promote formation of a con-
sensus. See, e.g., Olpin, supra note 12, at 960 (negotiating until mutually acceptable
decisions are reached is the goal of public participation); Hiruo, supra note 19. For an
illustrative list of groups using a consensus-building approach, see A Sampling of the West's
Collaborative Groups, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 17. However, a consensus
is not guaranteed by deliberative public participation. See Reich, supra note 93, at 1640.
This fact is demonstrated by the Ruckelshaus experiment discussed by Reich, see id., and
William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,190
(May 1994). Other scholars have advocated small-scale deliberation as a means to reach the
common good. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 81, at 952. For the philosophical and
theoretical perspective, see JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION, PLURALISM,
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY 24-25 (1996); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 81, at 270, 275.
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3. The Role of Trust in Public Participation
A prerequisite of deliberative decisionmaking is the existence of a
satisfactory relationship between members of the public and the agency
responsible for the environmental concern at issue.95 Without trust and
agency credibility this relationship is not possible. Prior research is not
wanting for the conclusion that Americans are dissatisfied with government
as usual.9 6 Prior scholarship also documents the conclusion that trust
between citizen participants and agency employees is essential to productive
public dialogue.97 The public does not expect government representatives to
lie,98 misinform,99 or ignore them.l°0 Nor does the public expect bureaucrats
" See Ruckelshaus, supra note 94, at 10,190 ("[I]n a democracy a public agency that is not
trusted... might as well close its doors.").
96 See generally STEPHEN C. CRAIG, THE MALEVOLENT LEADERS: POPULAR DISCONTENT
IN AMERICA 1-18 (1984).
9' See Baruch Fischhoff, Public Values in Risk Research, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci., 75, 81-83 (1996); K.S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts,
6 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 115, 115-18 (1995); EPA Efforts to Involve Citizens
Called More P.R. Than Substance, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Oct. 19, 1993, available in
1993 WL 2748682 ("[E]arly and full citizen involvement improves selection of cleanup
remedies and enhances public trust."); see also Hadden, supra note 79, at 54; PAUL SLOVIC
ET AL., PERCEIVED RISK, TRUST AND NUCLEAR WASTE 27-32; Thomas 0. McGarity, Risk and
Trust: The Role of Regulatory Agencies, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,200 (Aug.
1986) ("To a large extent, the entire collective risk assessment and risk management
enterprise rests upon public trust .... ). In general, Americans do not trust government
officials. See Collin & Collin, supra note 89, at 453-54.
9' See, e.g.,Liechtenstein et al., supra note 8, at 101.
9 See, e.g., Gilbert F. White, Editorial, Environmental Anxiety, ENV'T, Feb. 1988, at 1.
Mazmanian and Morell provide an excellent case study tracing environmental decisions
made informally by the government without an inadequate public participation program. The
public was critical of the decisions because the public felt its concerns were not taken
seriously. See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 58-75; see also Fremont J. Lyden
et al., Citizen Participation in Long-Range Planning: The RPA Experience, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 123, 136-37 (1990) (expressing sentiment that if the public was listened to by
policy makers, it would participate more) (citing L. HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, A SURVEY OF THE
PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES TOWARD SOIL, WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES CONSERVATION
POLICY pts. 1-5 (Mar. 1980)). It is not surprising, then, to find research indicating the
public's lack of confidence in public officials' desire or ability to resolve environmental
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to base findings on flawed science.'0 ' Public participation is viewed as an
antidote to these bureaucratic ills.° 2 Public participation enhances disclosure
and the quality of decisionmaking as citizens question the basis of agency
studies and thought processes.' °3 Trust is an indicia that an agency is, in fact,
accountable to the public."0 Accountability to the public requires either that
public voices are incorporated into environmental decisions in a manner
acceptable to the public,0 5 or that the public otherwise accepts the agency's
decision. 16
The roots of public skepticism and lack of trust of bureaucrats lies in
disputes. See Laird, supra note 88, at 546; Gloria S. McGregor, Permitting of Hazardous
Waste Management Facilities in California, 116 J. URB. PLAN. & DEV. 1, 1-3 (1990); M.E.
Williams, Workshop on Hazardous Waste, Strategies for Managing Present and Future
Waste, 119 RISK ANALYSIS 75, 92 (1991). Lack of trust in agencies in environmental
decisionmaking may reflect the dissatisfaction Americans have for government officials
generally. See CRAIG, supra note 96, at 12-13; Craig, supra note 24, at 49-50.
'0' See McGarity, supra note 97, at 10,200-01. Frequently, science is not flawed, but due
to the uncertainties in science, the public may perceive the limitations of science, or the state
of scientific knowledge, as a weaknesses undermining scientists' credibility. See Collin &
Collin, supra note 89, at 400-01.
102 See Becker, supra note 17, at 240.
'03 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 94, at 10,190.
" See id. Although trust is a linchpin in public dialogue, it is not the panacea to the full
range of potential weaknesses in the American form of public environmental decisionmaking.
This is a notorious problem with attempts to site hazardous waste facilities. See MAZMANIAN
& MORELL, supra note 13, at 190-91.
o' See Statement of Richard Guimond, EPA's acting assistant administrator for solid waste
and emergency response who was asked to respond to the question of how many records of
decision, or legally binding cleanup plans have been altered because of public comment. Mr.
Guimond responded: "I can't give you a hard number .... There are quite a few." EPA
Efforts to Involve Citizens Called More P.R. Than Substance, supra note 97. But compare
Judy Rosener, Making Bureaucrats Responsive: A Study of the Impact of Citizen
Participation and Staff Recommendations on Regulatory Decision Making, PUB. ADMIN.
REV., July-Aug. 1982, at 339 (reviewing California case study showing public participation
enhanced denial rate of development permits) with Goodenough, supra note 7, at 239-40; see
also Lyden et al., supra note 100, at 136 (majority of participants in case study felt
participation had no effect); Rosenbloom, supra note 29, at 26 (opining that modem citizen
participation has not been particularly effective).
106 See Jones, supra note 30 (forthcoming); Matheny & Williams, supra note 68, at 72-73.
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the "announce and defend" decisionmaking model, 107 a belief in checks and
balances,"0 8 traditional distrust of public officials,0 9 and the discovery of
disastrous, large-scale environmental events, such as Love Canal and Three
Mile Island."' The inherent problems of decide-announce-and-defend
decisionmaking have been well documented."' Crucial decisions are made
at junctures when the public is not involved, including the risk assessment
101 See Stenberg, supra note 13, at 190-91. "Announce and Defend" is a well-worn phrase.
Its usage in contemporary circles is exemplified by this passage: "The old process of 'decide,
announce and defend' is dead, but finding a workable replacement is difficult." Slants and
Trends, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Apr. 22, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2753926; see also
Federal Facilities. Community and Stakeholder Input Vital for More Cost-Effective
Remediations, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Apr. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7981748;
Panel Urges More Public Involvement in Remediation of Federal Facilities, AIR/WATER
POLLUTION REP. ENVTL. WK., May 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7981334.
"08 See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 46 (1996).
'09 See VIVIAN HART, DISTRUST AND DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL DISTRUST IN BRITAIN AND
AMERICA 81 (1978) ("[P]olitical distrust has been a recurrent and perhaps a permanent
feature of the history of the republic." ). The historic tradition of distrust is distinct from
decreases in trust experienced since the 1960s. See CRAIG, supra note 96, at 12-13; Laird,
supra note 88, at 544-45 (providing evidence of a decline in public confidence in public
leaders); Lazarus, supra note 64, at 314; Stenberg, supra note 13, at 191. Americans have
a long history of relating to officials on an arms-length basis. See generally Craig, supra note
24, at 46-51.
..0 See generally Roger G. Noll, Reforming Risk Regulation, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., 165, 175 ("The public's declining faith in experts is not completely irrational,
given the presence of a serious agency problem between citizens and the government."); see
also supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 233 and accompanying text.
... See id.; see also Bruce B. Clary & Michael E. Kraft, Impact Assessment and Policy
Failure: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 105, 112 (1988)
(concluding that public hearings do little to make Department of Energy's ("DOE") proposed
siting of hazardous waste facility acceptable to public); Activists Push for More Input to
Alm's Accelerated Cleanup, supra note 54, at 159 (describing "announce and defend" as a
source of tension between DOE and the public); Caron Chess & Billie Jo Hance, Opening
Doors: Making Risk Communication Agency Reality, 11 ENV'T 11, 14 (1989) (emphasizing
the need for early public participation).
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process. 12 An agency makes policy decisions, then announces its decisions
after the fact." 3 As established by the APA, the "announce and defend""' 4
decisionmaking framework fosters accountability only in the form of post-
decision ratification," 5 rather than meaningful incorporation of public
input." 6 This problem is replicated in substantive environmental law." 7
Environmental decisionmaking literature indicates there is a pivotal
period for public input, after which public participation will not seriously
affect substantive decisionmaking. "8 In any given scenario, the pivotal point
or period for public input is relative. At some juncture, a decision or series
of decisions are made that are virtually irreversible and chart the future of the
project or problem at issue and form or narrow the possible concerns that can
be addressed." 9 When the public has not participated meaningfully in the
proceedings (both in an informal and formal sense) leading to the pivotal
decision, or series of pivotal decisions, then the decision rests on a weakened
form of political legitimacy and stability.
One might expect that in the presence of exclusionary
decisionmaking, the public would resort to other forms of political
12 See, e.g., EPA Efforts to Involve Citizens Called More P.R. than Substance, supra note
97. In commenting on public participation under Superfund, William Roberts, director of
the Environmental Defense Fund opined that the "critical decisional stages where current law
does not mandate citizen involvement include: preliminary assessment and site analysis;
development of site health assessment studies; and remedy implementation and oversight."
Id; see also supra note 100.
113 See supra note 111.
114 See supra note 104.
5 See supra note 100.
..6 See Daniel Wartenberg & Caron Chess, The Risk Wars: Assessing Risk Assessment,
NEW SOLUTIONS, Winter 1993, at 16, 24.
VI See generally supra Part I.
18 See Hadden, supra note 79, at 49.
19 See Tabb, supra note 59, at 176 (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d
1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) and Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983));
cf Lyden et al., supra note 100, at 136 (describing a survey of public participants indicating
that forty-five percent of the respondents felt that "their involvement in the Forest Service's
planning process had no effect on the end result because the Forest Service had already made
all the relevant decisions before their participation was requested").
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expression, the most obvious being court adjudication, 20 if available. 1 ' The
judiciary, in turn, can restore legitimacy by forcing procedural due process,12 2
120 Litigation is one form of public participation. See Becker, supra note 17, at 238. In
some senses, however, litigation is an inferior form of participation. See Bram, supra note
8, at 154-55.
If agencies fail to negotiate agreement with the relevant interest groups on
the scientific basis and policy objectives for their regulations, court battles
will certainly ensue. Litigation, although it provides an opportunity for
direct citizen participation in regulatory politics, proves costly and time-
consuming, and potentially threatens to undermine administrative
legitimacy since federal regulation appears to indeed turn on the judicial
imprimatur.
David M. O'Brien, The Courts and Science-Policy Disputes: A Review and Commentary on
the Role of the Judiciary in Regulatory Politics, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 81, 104 (1983).
The drawbacks of litigation have been supported by other scholars. See GAIL BINGHAM,
RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 136 (1986) (studying delays in environmental
litigation). Moreover, judicial activism may not be conducive to consensus-building, tending
to polarize parties and dichotomize interests. See Lazarus, supra note 64, at 354. But see
Futrell, supra note 17, at 35 ("Litigation resolved many important controversies in the
environmentalists' favor. The threat of litigation prevented many more from ever
occurring.").
.. The vast majority of our substantive environmental laws have "private attorney general"
provisions, see Futrell, supra note 17, at 90. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
("SLAPP"), however, are promoted by laws providing restricted, limited, or no public
participation. See Art Charlton, Mansfield Planners Suing Over Challenge Citizen Group
Faces Fee Reimbursement, STAR LEDGER, Aug. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7957958;
Vicki Haddock, Bay Area Garages v. Toxic Avengers Environmentalists, S.F. EXAMINER,
June 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3712622; Carlos Moncada & Susan Jaffe, Judge
Delays Action in Water War Suit, TAMPA TRIB., May 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10226930; SLAPPed Down, COURIER J., Aug. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6357001. The
sole exception to citizen enforcement provisions in major environmental laws is the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994).
22 See, e.g., Williamsburg Around the Bridge Block Assoc. v. Rudolph Guiliani, 644
N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. 1996) (explaining implementation of decision to re-construct bridge
halted in absence of prior public participation); Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (notice and comment insufficient); Chocolate Mfrs. Assoc. of the United States
v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985). Judicial review of agency decisions is provided by
the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.") (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
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but can not expand participatory rights beyond the statutory minimum.,
Thus, while some agencies have taken steps to include the public in the risk
assessment process, they are generally voluntary efforts.
Given the status of public participation law, we can continue to expect
conflicts over environmental decisions imposed on unwilling communities. 1
24
Where community members are actively involved, however, decisions rest
on a stronger political foundation. Thus, public participation embraces the
prospect of stability. This theory is explored in more detail in the discussion
that follows.
B. Improved Outcomes
1. Efficiency
Theories about how public participation improves decisions are wide
and varied. A common theme stresses the role of public participation in
resolving societal conflicts that otherwise would be determined in a court of
law. As one scholar has aptly stated: "One harmful result of ... issue
polarization is excessive reliance on litigation to resolve conflicts. Indeed,
agency decisionmaking becomes a mere prelude to litigation."'25  This
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam) and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
123 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
(West 1994) (calling for enhanced public participation while not purporting to amend
substantive law).
124 See JOHN M. STONEHOUSE & JOHN D. MUMFORD, SCIENCE, RISK ANALYSIS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DECISIONS 57 (1994); Matheny & Williams, supra note 68, at 72-
73.
25 Lazarus, supra note 64, at 354 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT, 283-84 (Basic Books, 1990)). Although
litigation is a form of public participation, see supra note 120, litigation is not only time
consuming and costly, but is instituted after a final agency decision. This "does nothing to
further early'consideration of environmental factors." Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,
415-16 (1976) (J. Marshall, concurring).
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statement may be accurate to the extent litigation is a viable alternative126
given the variety of disincentives and obstacles to the initiation of a lawsuit.
Litigation obstacles include the cost of litigation relative to the probable
outcome,127 and legal doctrines, such as standing and ripeness. Major agency
decisions, such as siting a hazardous waste facility, may present the right
combination of incentives and salient social concerns prompting review in a
court of law.
Many decisions, in isolation, will not warrant litigation, however,
because they are seen either as insignificant in terms of environmental harm
or human health risk, or as not worthy of litigation costs, or not a final,
reviewable decision. Still, whether a decision is the type that would
ordinarily find its way to a judge or not, does not detract from the benefits of
deliberating over all public goods decisions. Courts are known for
dichotomous, win/lose outcomes, where adversarial procedures are not
conducive to interactive learning, free and open exchange of information, and
communal resolution.'28 In addition to potentially averting litigation, public
participation can improve the decisionmaking process by furthering
efficiency129 or effectiveness, 130 in terms of cost' and time.'32 Some
126 Cf Barker, supra note 77, 217-18 (discussing study where litigation was seen as an
uncommon mode of political expression).
17 Cf O'Brien, supra note 120, at 104.
128 See THOMAS J. SHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW
211 (3rd. ed. 1996) ("The formality and divisiveness inherent in the adversary system may
restrain resources, limit creative options, and frequently ignore the real environmental
questions underlying the conflict.").
129 See Federal Facilities: Community and Stakeholder Input Vital for More Cost-
Effective Remediations, supra note 107.
3o See Ferris, supra note 69, at 676.
1' See Federal Facilities: Community and Stakeholder Input Vital for More Cost-
Effective Remediations, supra note 107.
32 See Barker, supra note 77, at 218-19 (citing costs associated with producing public
reports regarding nuclear reactor siting in Britain); Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision
Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1111, 1117 (1991) (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of
Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655,
659-60 (1985)); McAlpine & LaDonne, supra note 12, at 207. But see GERRARD, supra note
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commentators, however, have reached the opposite conclusion.'33 Whether
or not public participation enhances or detracts from efficient decisionmaking
is highly case-sensitive. Narrowly focusing on the time or dollars expended
on public participation also may mask hidden costs caused by failing to
involve the public in environmental decisionmaking 34 There simply are not
sufficient, if any, quantitative studies documenting the costs associated with
environmental decisionmaking processes that include public participation.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution/Environmental Dispute Resolution
Public participation is the functional equivalent of Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR") 135 and Environmental Dispute Resolution ("EDR"). 136
One goal of public participation is to mediate, negotiate, or otherwise resolve
disputes without litigation.'37 Many have contended that public participation
diverts and resolves what would otherwise become issues raised in a court of
law.'38 While proving a negative is exceedingly difficult, there are coherent
theories to support the conclusion that public participation reduces litigation.
Consider the public risk assessment concerns that should be resolved
7, at 131 (stating public participation enhances opposition to hazardous-waste facility
sitings).
113 See GERRARD, supra note 7, at 13 1; Cross, supra note 79, at 950.
'4 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
'3 ADR offers an alternative to court adjudication of enviromnental disputes. ADR pro-
cesses include: "negotiation, conciliation, mediation, fact finding, mini-trials, and binding
arbitration." SHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 128, at 211; see also Frank P. Grad,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157, 157-61
(1989). See generally Patrick A. Parenteau, Everything You Need to Know About
Environmental Law, You Learned in Kindergarten, 23 ENVTL. L. 223, 231-32 (1993).
136 See, e.g., Sassaman, supra note 68, at 215-20; Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein,
Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 311,
311-13 (1980).
137 See Cross, supra note 77, at 955.
38 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 17, at 240; Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and
Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 522 (1989); Risk
Assessment: NRC Panel Says More Involvement by Public Would Help Curb Litigation,
supra note 18, at D 11.
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primarily in a more deliberative forum, as opposed to an adversarial
environment. While scientific uncertainty may make litigation more
inviting,' scientific uncertainty has been associated with distrust, 4 ' and
especially with unwanted judicial activism. 4' The less reliable the data, due
to unavailability, insufficient quantity, or invalidity, the more choices,
guesses, inferences, and conclusions about the use of the data that can be
made.44 Because choices in the use of data involve these value judgments,
39 Scientific uncertainty has been addressed by several scholars in other contexts. See
generally John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 264 n.4, 264-66 (1991).
Several publications document the significant gaps in data, knowledge, and research relative
to environmental analysis. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL FACILITIES:
CONSISTENT RELATIVE RJSK EVALUATIONS NEEDED FOR PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS (stating that
inventory of contamination at federal facilities is incomplete and use inconsistent
methodologies); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION 62-64 (1991); Brown, supra
note 69, at 186-87 (providing a discussion of scientific uncertainty in risk assessment); Adam
M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions
of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 295 (1995); R. Michael
M'Gonigle et al., Taking Uncertainty Seriously: From Permissive Regulation to Preventive
Design in Environmental Decision Making, 32 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 99, 99-102 (1994);
Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial
Competence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094, 1097-98. Scientific uncertainty is a reflection of experts'
inability to measure phenomenon, obtain data, or specify a model. See Adam M. Finkel,
Comparing Risk Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 325, 336 (1996).
40 See Gerlach, supra note 8, at 283; Branden B. Johnson & Paul Slovic, "Improving"
Risk Communication and Risk Management: Legislated Solutions or Legislated Disasters?,
14 RISK ANALYSIS 905, 906 (1994); Matheny & Williams, supra note 68, at 72-73
(discussing distrust caused by involuntary nature of hazardous-waste facility siting).
41 See Mary R. English, Can Risk Assessment and Risk Prioritization be Extricated From
Risk Management?, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 495, 496 (James
J. Bonin & Donald E. Stevenson eds., 1989) (noting that uncertainty may cause intractable
conflicts in managing risk). Further, the judicial process is inherently more adversarial than
most public participation mechanisms. See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 191.
Litigation of environmental disputes may be marked by "formality and divisiveness inherent
in the adversarial system." SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 128, at 211.
142 See E.P.A., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(1990). See generally Penelope A. Fenner-Crisp, Risk Assessment 'A La Mode'- How
Much Data is Enough? 3 RISK POL'Y REP., Feb. 21, 1997, at 19-20.
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the public demands to be involved. 143
If the public and technocrats do not resolve their differences through
deliberation, the court acts as referee between scientists or technicians who
disagree,'44 or between a public demanding that the law fill a gap because
scientific research is underdeveloped, inchoate, or in nascent form.'45 In
prophylactic decisionmaking, court intervention is less likely. In contrast,
where members of the public already have been injured and at least some
members of the scientific community support their claims, no amount of
education or dialogue is likely to placate the public. Indeed, the question is
education about what? Given the disparity in scientific opinion, the injured
public's belief that compensation is warranted is reinforced. In turn, public
participation mechanisms are not procedurally or legally tailored for
assessing fault and awarding damages; thus, litigation becomes a viable mode
of political expression and redress.'46
Cases poised for litigation have traveled too far in the dispute
resolution process to make public participation useful. Earlier use of public
participation is warranted, however. Of particular significance is the use of
public participation as a mechanism for revealing value choices made in the
risk assessment process.
3. Value Choices and Policy Implications
Value choices are made both while experts study environmental
143 See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
See generally Phil Brown, Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination:
Lay and Professional Ways of Knowing, 33 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 267, 273 (1992).
"'5 See Gerlach, supra note 8, at 280 (explaining the uncertainties, requiring "guesswork"
on the part of experts: "When technical specialists disagree among themselves, they say this
is chiefly because they begin with different assumptions, use a different scientific procedure,
or do not yet have enough data.").
46 This helps explain, in part, the purported litigious nature of American citizens. See
Nelson W. Polsby, Foreword, in CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS i, xiv (Pietro S.
Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom eds., 1961). For a general essay on American political
culture and litigiousness, see David M. O'Brien, "The Imperial Judiciary:" Of Paper Tigers
and Socio-Legal Indicators, 2 J.L. & POL. 1, 1-10 (1985).
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conditions and when conclusions about the use of that science are drawn. 47
Yet scientists may not reflect the diversity of opinion in the population at
large. Communities are composed of members of an infinite variety of
backgrounds. 48  Ensurance that diverse concerns are vocalized, requires
direct public input. 49 If an agency does not understand the local population,
significant values or concerns may not be included 5 ' or the substance of the
"7 See Tom Webster & Paul Connett, Risk Assessment: A Public Health Hazard, 10 J.
PESTICIDE REFORM 26, 27-28 (1990); cf George L. Carlo et al., The Interplay of Science,
Values, and Experiences Among Scientists Asked to Evaluate the Hazards of Dioxin,
Radiation, and Tobacco Smoke, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 37, 41 (1992) (concluding that scientist's
perception of risk may be influenced by personal values). See generally Brown, supra note
144, at 272-76.
141 See, e.g., James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health
Risks, 14 RSK ANALYSIS 1101, 1102 (1994) (concluding gender as well as race may correlate
with diverse views of risk); cf T. Jean Blocker & Douglas Lee Eckberg, Environmental
Issues as Women's Issues: General Concerns and Local Hazards, 70 Soc. SCI. Q. 586, 587
(1993) (finding that women are more concerned about local environmental conditions than
men); Jan M. Gutteling & Oene Wiegman, Gender-Specific Reactions to Environmental
Hazards in the Netherlands, 28 SEx ROLES 433, 433-35 (1993) (finding that women may be
more anxious about environmental risks).
"" See generally DEWITT JOHN, Civic ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REG-
ULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES (1994) (presenting three case studies illustrating the
value of localized public participation). Indeed, the public may bring a panoply of concerns
experts do not include in formal risk assessment. Mazmanian and Morell identify the
following as having heightened risk concern for the public: involuntariness, exposure,
manmade contamination, presence of hazard, benefits to host community, and distribution
of risk to beneficiaries of pollution or contamination. See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra
note 13, at 184-85; see also WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND
THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 86-94 (1976); STONEHOUSE & MUMFORD, supra note 124,
at 39-42 (identifying the following public values: "inadequate, unclear or selective
corresponding benefits," "involuntary risk," "outside personal control," "unethical or unfair"
distribution of risk, "untrustworthy information sources;" manmade risks; "unknown time
duration," "unfamiliar" risks; and those associated with untoward catastrophic events).
50 See generally Cross, supra note 77, at 937 ("Public perception . . . will reflect the
concerns of the majority, particularly those with the resources to be heard, and may
discriminate against the disadvantaged minorities.").
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risk assessment may not include sub-populations. 5 who may have unique or
heightened risk concerns.15
2
4. Value Choices and Scientific Inquiry'53
Public values became increasingly salient with the advent of
quantitative risk assessment as standard procedure for studying and
characterizing health effects associated with changes to the environment.
When the Red Book procedure was conceived, the NRC believed that risk
"' See, e.g., Brown, supra note 144, at 273 (discussing the work of activists for women's
health and workers' health); Collin, supra note 4, at 170 ("If white males determine the level
of acceptable risk, and the 155 pound white male is the standard for human measurement of
risk, then it is likely that society will be exposed to risks that are unacceptable .... "); Kuehn,
supra note 22, at 116-26 (criticizing the white male paradigm). Research from the 1970s
demonstrated that participants in public participation programs tended to be white, well-
educated, and middle and upper class. See Stephen D. Cupps, Emerging Problems of Citizen
Participation, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 478, 478-80 (1977); Walter A. Rosenbaum, The
Paradoxes of Public Participation, 8 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 355, 357 (1976).
52 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 572 ("Local individuals, who will be most directly
affected by a government action, can provide unique information about the impacts of the
proposed action that the government may be unable to obtain elsewhere.") (citations
omitted); JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S Toxic LEGACY: How SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO
PROTECT Us FROM PESTICIDES 7-10 (1996) (questioning assumptions made about the risk of
pesticide residues to children and others). The importance of including social values is
beginning to receive official recognition. See NATURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING
CONSENSUS: RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PROGRAM 153-55 (1994); CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 88-90 (1993). Other literature suggests that perceptions of
risk may reflect culture. See Robin Cantor & Mark Schoepfle, Risk, Rationality, and
Community: Psychology, Ethnography, and Transactions in the Risk Management Process,
15 ENVTL. PROF. 293, 296 (1993).
153 "[I]n reaction to the public's often emotional response to risk, scientists are tempted to
disguise controversial value decisions in the cloak of scientific objectivity, obscuring those
decisions from political accountability." David Bazelon, Risk and Rationality, 205 SCI. 277,
280 (1979).
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assessment and risk management were distinct activities.'54 The debate
continues. Some have argued that risk assessment requires less, if any, public
participation since risk assessment focuses on questions of fact,'55 as opposed
to risk management, which focuses on policy decisions. 5 6 For commentators
who contend that risk assessment does not involve policy decisions and value
judgments, risk assessment simply is the tool and territory of experts who
make "factual" decisions, 57 thereby negating the need for public input or
participation in policy formation.
Others argue there is not a clear line between risk assessment and risk
4 See Milton Russell & Michael Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy-
Making, 236 SCI. 286, 286-87 (1987). While the EPA initially seemed to accept this, see
E.P.A., FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE: RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT AT EPA
(1984), EPA is no longer wedded to this dichotomy. See, e.g., E.P.A., ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (1992); cf NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN
RISK ASSESSMENT (1994).
155 See RED BOOK, supra note 4, at 18. Cross writes that "[v]alue judgments are largely
irrelevant to the probabilistic determination of scientific risk." Cross, supra note 77, at 889-
90. Mayo states that at each stage where there is more than one scientifically acceptable
answer, there is a choice to be made among alternatives. See Deborah G. Mayo, Sociological
Versus Metascientific Views of Risk Assessment, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE 249, 249-52
(Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991).
" Some researchers view risk management as involving questions about the proper res-
ponse in light of the risk assessment. Compare, e.g., LOWRANCE, supra note 149, at 86-94
with Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy Divorce, in
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 155, at 100 (separation of assessment and management
ill-advised).
' See Cross, supra note 77, at 889; see, e.g., Gerlach, supra note 8, at 279-80 (reporting
that "[one of] the controversies of the drought often voiced by technical specialists is that
most people were emotionally involved, politically motivated, or technologically
unsophisticated, and thus confused the real facts of the drought with perceived facts"). See
E.P.A., GUIDANCE FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (1991) (arguing that risk assessment does not
involve non-scientific factors); William D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy,
221 SCI. 1026, 1027-28 (1983) ("[R]isk assessment at EPA must be based only on scientific
evidence and scientific consensus.").
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management.' These researches contend that during both stages of activity,
value choices are made.' 59 Public participation may expose faulty underlying
assumptions and value judgments made by scientists and other experts
engaged in the risk assessment process. 60 Each assumption or inference
involves a choice among competing assumptions and inferences. 6'
' See Russell & Gruber, supra note 154, at 286. Shrader-Frechette argues that the line
between risk assessment and risk management is blurred, and that during both processes, the
public should have an active role. See Shrader-Frechette, supra note 97, at 122-24; see also
Silbergeld, supra note 156, at 100.
9 See, e.g., John D. Graham & Lorenz Rhomberg, How Risks Are Identified and Assess-
ed, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 22-23 (1996) (illustrating the necessity of
qualitative judgments to determine the preferred risk option among a choice of risk
scenarios); Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Science, Values, and Risk, 545 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 119-20 (1996) (contending that scientists make any number of
choices in risk assessment).
160 Research indicating that value judgments are inherent in risk assessment activities is
rich. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty
Years of Process, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 137, 139 (1995) ("Values are inherent in risk
assessment."); Gerlach, supra note 8, at 280 ("When technical specialists disagree among
themselves, they say this is chiefly because they begin with different assumptions, use a
different scientific procedure, or do not yet have enough data."); Gillette & Krier, supra note
1, at 1085 ("[T]he problem comes down to one of competing rationalities."); Sheila Jasanoff,
Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science, 4 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 143 (1993);
Lynn, supra note 71, at 47-48.
For a good general discussion of potential biases in the risk assessment process, see
Donald W. Stever, The Use of Risk Assessment in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 329, 339-40 (1989). Risk assessments depend on any number of assumptions and
inferences. See Shere, supra note 4, at 413; see, e.g., Pollak, supra note 5, at 27-28 (finding
that given equal doses of formaldehyde, the incidence of carcinoma was 50 percent in rats
but only 3.3 percent for mice); Alon Rosenthal et al., supra note 4, at 295; cf Richard Wilson
& E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction, 236 SCI. 267, 270
(1987) (probability of death from Chernobyl disaster varies widely).
161 As explained by Kenneth R. Foster et al.:
Science is more than tests and observations; it is also the construction of
theories and the testing of theories by experiments. Science advances by
a sinnowing and sifting process (in the words of Yale physicist Robert K.
Adair) through which sound hypotheses become accepted and incorrect
data and ideas are forgotten. Science converges. This convergence occurs
in risk research as assimilating epidemiological evidence becomes stronger
[Vol. 22:001
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Inevitably during the process, values influence the determinants.162 Values
influence "the allocation of resources to studying specific risks or risks in
general - and, thereby, produce the data needed to motivate action or quiet
concerns. Values are also reflected in how risks are characterized."' 63
There has been one retort: "science." But no one has been able to
empirically prove that science is in fact value-neutral or value-free."
Experts make socially-relevant choices influenced by their vision of the
future, 65 thoughts about the end-goal of research, 166 the state of scientific
and other scientists begin to work out the underlying biological
mechanisms for the effects.
KENNETH R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 19 (1993).
162 See, e.g., Pollak, supra note 5, at 31 (extrapolating findings of bioassay study to hum-
ans could be based on comparison of body weight or on a comparison of surface area).
163 Fischhoff, supra note 160, at 139 (citation omitted). See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL,
ACCEPTABLE RISK 55 (1981); see also Paustenbach, supra note 4, at 402-05 (1989)
(discussing some of the assumptions upon which risk assessments rest). To illustrate how
value choices influence risk characterization, see Baruch Fischhoff et al., Defining Risk, 17
POL'Y STUD. 123, 125 (1984) (citing researchers who chose different units of measure to
analyze exposure risks: "For some, the unit of choice is the annual death toll.., for others,
death per person exposed or per hour of exposure . . .for others, it is the loss of life
expectancy ... for still others, lost working days.") (citations omitted).
" See generally Brown, supra note 144, at 273 (summarizing previous findings about the
limitations and biases built into scientific research). Cf FOSTER ET AL, supra note 161, at 7
("Epidemiology relies on statistics, and it is a cardinal rule of science that statistics cannot
prove causation.").
65 See infra note 170.
'6 Dowie notes the tension between the expectation that science will seek some objective
truth and the fact that scientists may be paid to support business or industry concerns or
interests. See DowIE, supra note 17, at 139.
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knowledge, 6 ' and personal stake in the process and outcome.168 In its purest
form, scientific conclusions are reached through repetition and peer review
consensus169 among a relevant group of scientists as to the existence of facts
and the laws that govern any findings. 7 ' At times, the public may expose
risks ignored or considered insignificant by the scientific community. 7'
For the above reasons, some scholars have advocated public
involvement in the risk assessment process. Expressing concern over value-
67 See Lazarus supra note 64, at 321-22; C.F. Wilkinson, 1 COMENTS TOXICOLOGY 1
(1986) (the science of toxicology simply cannot provide unequivocal answers to many of the
questions being asked by the public and demanded by the regulatory process).
68 See id.; see also Nicholas A. Ashford & Karin A. Gregory, Ethical Problems in Using
Science in the Regulatory Process, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13, 16, 56 (1987) (arguing
scientists may be influenced by job security and research funds); Barry I. Castlemant &
Grace E. Zeim, Corporate Influence on Threshold Limit Values, 13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 531,
531-33 (1988); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1816 (1989); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1276 (1987); Shrader-
Frechette, supra note 97, at 122 ("[I]nstitutional goals, such as promoting a particular
technology, influence assessment.").
169 See Ashford & Gregory, supra note 168, at 13. For a good overview of the peer review
process used to judge endeavors, see STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH 55-56 (1994) and
Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science and Law, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 343, 344-49 (1989). For a discussion of the scientific process, see
Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 95-105 (1988). Internecine disputes may serve to undermine public confidence in
scientists. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 161, at 10 (discussing critique of Yale
epidemiologist Alvan Feinstein).
70 Steven Goldberg describes the scientific process as follows:
A scientist can come up with a hypothesis about the natural world through
any process at all - systematic study, inspired speculation, or fevered
dreams. But that hypothesis must ultimately be subject to controlled tests,
reproducible by others. A new hypothesis that stands up to testing and
explains important matters not previously understood will eventually be
accepted by other scientists.
GOLDBERG, supra note 169, at 7.
... See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken? A Review of the Hon. Stephen
Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 24 ENVTL. L.
1707, 1726 (1994) (book review).
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laden public decisions made exclusively by scientists or other technocrats, 7 2
Professor Sheila Jasanoff contends that environmental decisionmaking should
be marked by "integrity, critical thinking, willingness to disclose the
weaknesses in one's argument . . . quite simply the norms of good
decisionmaking, fundamental to our democratic culture. Honesty, rationality,
and full disclosure are virtues of paramount importance to science as well as
public policy. ' 173 Public participation may shed light on scientific value
judgements that may or may not conform to societal values. 74 Underlying
Professor Jasanoff's statement are concerns expressed by Stephen Cotgrove:
"Rules against pollution can only be understood as part of the defense of a
specific social order. And this is at heart always a moral order - some state
of society which is deemed to be valuable and worth preserving."75 Whose
vision of our future world should prevail is a matter of public debate and
reflection.
Other scholars, 176  predominantly anthropologists,'77  are also
supporters of public participation in the risk assessment/risk management
process. These academics argue that the public has privileged knowledge,
both about how their world works (or should work) and through their
172 See JASANOFF, supra note 72, at 3.
3 See SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 273 (1986).
Suggestions include: disclosure of cost considerations, level of risk assumed, and sci-
entific uncertainty. See Brown, supra note 69, at 187.
171 Cotgrove, supra note 79, at 123. As an example, Cotgrove cites sentiment over nuclear
power: "Risk is not just a statistical calculation. It is also a moral judgment about defensible
conduct. For the proponents of nuclear power, the overriding importance of wealth creation
is sufficient moral justification for the risks involved. For the environmentalists, there is no
such moral justification." Id. at 124-25; see also Russell & Gruber, supra note 154, at 290
(stating that risk assessment policies revolve around "our conflicting desires for prosperity,
justice, equity, and environmental quality").
176 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 572 (public provides unique input) (citing Luke W. Cole,
Legal Services, Public Participation, and Environmental Justice, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
449, 454 (1995)).
' See, e.g., D.W. BROKENSHA ET AL., INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: SYSTEMS AND DEV-
ELOPMENT 3-6 (1980).
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interaction with the natural environment, including lifestyle factors. 7 '
Indeed, activists have identified problems previously ignored or avoided by
experts. 7 9 Consider, hypothetically, risk assessors working in a less-affluent
community. Assume further that the scientific and technical task is to
develop a risk assessment for the consumption of fish from a local river. The
risk assessors agree that the average male will eat one portion of fish per
week. In point of fact, men, women, children, and the elderly consume a
much higher quantity. 8 ' In the hypothetical, there may be a number of
reasons for a higher rate of consumption among a more diverse populace than
what was assumed by the experts, including subsistence.'' Also, the act of
fishing may have social or cultural significance unknown to the
researchers.' 82 Moreover, determinations about what should constitute a
7 See Phil Brown, When the Public Knows Better: Popular Epidemiology Challenges
the System, 35 ENV'T 17, 19 (1993); Branden B. Johnson, Advancing Understanding of
Knowledge's Role in Lay Risk Perception, 4 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 189, 189-90
(1992). The EPA has been advised by its Scientific Advisory Board to ask the public to
provide information relevant to risk assessment. See Miller & Keller, supra note 3, at 42.
"' See Brown, supra note 144, at 273 (summarizing findings of past research indicating
activists' role in "uncover[ing]... DES, Agent Orange, asbestos, pesticides, unnecessary
hysterectomies, sterilization abuse, and black lung") (citations omitted).
8 See Kuehn, supra note 22, at 121-24 (criticizing white male assumption used in risk
assessment); Samara F. Swanston, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate Impact: What
Can We Do About the Failure to Protect the Most Vulnerable?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577,
592-95 (1994); Sheila H. Zahm et al., Inclusion of Women and Minorities in Occupational
Cancer Epidemiological Research, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 842, 843 (1994).
"' See Public Involvement Termed Key for Success of Cleanup Projects, NUCLEAR WASTE
NEWS, Aug. 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2410041 (asserting that Native American
nations have unique concerns relative to their culture); see also Patrick C. West, Health
Concerns for Fish Eating Tribes?, E.P.A.J., Mar-Apr. 1992, at 15.
182 This hypothetical is in part a reflection of discussion the author has had with colleagues
at Southern University and Louisiana State University. My thanks are extended to: Winston
Brumfield, Robert Conner, Lincoln Moore of Southern University, and Maude Walsh and
Magaret Reams of Louisiana State University. For a case study of a similar scenario, see Jeff
Johnson, Mohawk Environmental Health Project Integrates Research Into the Community,
30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH., at 20A, 21A ("Both in legend and ceremony, Mohawks celebrate
their relationship to the fish of their rivers.., now they were being told the solution to their
health problems was to not eat fish.").
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"risk," and how to respond to the risk may be colored by a public's
perception about the cause and manifestation of the risk or harm, such as
attributing it to an act of God, karma, or fate.'83 Experts who exclude harm
to sub-populations or who are not sensitive to the public's sociological frame
of reference, 84 will not produce wholly relevant or satisfactory risk studies.
C. Public Education and Risk Communication185
Risk assessment and environmental decisionmaking generally seem
to be headed on a collision course: Citizens are demanding involvement, but
are members of the public capable of intelligently debating relevant issues?
Information,'86 education, 87 and risk communication 88 are necessary for
183 See id.
's See Cantor & Schoepfle, supra note 152, at 296.
185 In general, I use the term "risk communication" to connote the activity of exchanging
ideas and information about risk. See Dencen M. De Rodes, Risk Perception and Risk
Communication in the Public Decision-Making Process, 8 J. PLAN. LIT. 329, 330-32 (1994).
See generally Peter M. Sandman, Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of
Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 9 SETON HALL LEG. J. 437, 438 (1986); Amy K. Wolfe,
Risk Communication in the Social Context. Improving Effective Communication, 15 ENVTL.
PROF. 248, 250 (1993). Risk communication has been incorporated in some substantive
environmental laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
186 See Dembach, supra note 46, at 65 (finding that by not listing chemicals as hazardous,
the public is left with insufficient information to ensure meaningful public participation);
Frank N. Laird, Information and Disaster Prevention, in LEARNING FROM DISASTER 204
(Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 435 (1994) (detailing information necessary for meaningful
public input). There is scholarship indicating that too much information can lead to
confusion in decisionmaking. Cf Fischhoff, supra note 160, at 140 (concluding too much
or irrelevant information should be filtered from the public); M.L. Livingston, Game
Strategic Behavior Under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES, supra note 141, at 458-59. Other research also indicates that
no amount of information can resolve intractable disputes. See Barker, supra fiote 77, at 222.
In a similar vein, research suggests that increased education will only increase public fears
about the impact of an environmental decision. See Robert C. Mitchell, Rationality and
Irrationality in the Public's Perception of Nuclear Power, in PUBLIC REACTIONS TO
NUCLEAR POWER: ARE THERE CRITICAL MASSES 22, 24-26 (W.R. Freudenberg & E.A. Rosa
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members of the public to discuss issues with experts and bureaucrats.'89
Education provides the skills to debate with experts, a basis for criticizing
personal habits relevant to the quality of the environment, 9 ' and facilitates
dialogue necessary to reach agreement among decisionmakers.' 9' The extent
to which we can adequately address participation by uninformed citizens
presents a significant challenge.'92
1. Education
The public is not a monolithic group of uneducated or undereducated
citizens.'93 Indeed, many case studies indicate that some publics are as
informed as the experts they encounter, 9 4 sometimes developing expertise
eds., 1984).
187 See Lazarus, supra note 64, at 372-73 (listing education necessary to facilitate under-
standing of risks); Matheny & Williams, supra note 68, at 72-73 (emphasizing the role
educating public has in acceptance of hazardous waste sitings).
.8 See, e.g., George I. Balch & Sharyn M. Sutton, Putting the Audience First: Conducting
Useful Evaluation for a Risk-Related Government Agency, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 163, 164
(1995); Chess & Hance, supra note 11, at 11-12.
89 See, e.g., LUTHER J. CARTER, NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST: DEALING
WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE 416 (1987); Kent E. Portney, The Potential of the Theory of
Compensation for Mitigating Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Treatment Siting.
Some Evidence From Five Massachusetts Communities, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 81, 81-82 (1985).
Education may also be correlated with the rate of political participation. See Fiorino, supra
note 138, at 515-17.
90 See generally Lazarus, supra note 64, at 372-73. For a discussion of the role of life-
style and human health, see VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND
SOCIAL CHOICE 52-54 (1974).
191 See NATURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING CONSENSUS: RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENTOF THE DEPARTM ENTOF ENERGY'S ENVIRONM ENTAL REM EDIATION PROGRAM
153-55 (1994).
92 See generally MATHEWS, supra note 72, at 73-74; Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip
Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, 248 SCI. 559, 560 (1990).
193 See GERRARD, supra note 7, at 131 (describing opponents of hazardous-waste siting as
knowledgeable proponents).
"" See Clary & Kraft, supra note 111, at 111 (finding the public informed on technical
issues).
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during the public participation process. 95 Nevertheless, lack of basic
mathematical and scientific skills appears to be the norm in the United
States, 196 and that is the general assumption made in this article.197 Improved
mathematical and scientific knowledge and skills,1 98 however, may not co-opt
the public in to supporting the official opinion of scientific and technical
experts.' 99 Statistically low risks generally are considered acceptable by
experts.200 In contrast, the public may exhibit elevated levels of fear over
low-probability mortality activities, such as the use of nuclear power.2' The
public may even knowingly choose a high-probability mortality death option
to the exclusion of a lower-probability death alternative.20 2 This may hold
'g See Jones, supra note 30 (forthcoming 1997); John P. Plumee et al., supra note 7, at
465,469.
"9 See Peter Applebome, US. Gets 'Average' Grades in Math and Science Studies, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at Al.
197 See infra note 214.
" Such improved knowledge and skills can, however, serve to reduce the extent to which
the public and experts talk past each other. For example, the public's working definition of
"probable" may be that which is memorable, because, according to experts, it is mentally
available; memories of disasters are invoked in this way. See STONEHOUSE &. MUMFORD,
supra note 124, at 39-42.
' See Wolfe, supra note 185, at 251, 253-54. Others believe that at some point the ed-
ucated lay person's expertise is such that she becomes an expert herself, often aligning her
preferences with the official experts. See Plumee et al., supra note 7, at 465, 469.
200 See Bray, supra note 132, at 1128-30.
201 See Barker, supra note 77, at 210. For a philosophical treatment dealing with the risk
of death and its implications in public policy formation, see John M. Taurek, Should the
Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 293, 293-96 (1977); see also Cross, supra note
77, at 895; Ilan B. Vertinsky & Donald A. Wehrung, Risk Perception and Drug Safety
Evaluation, 2 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENv'T 281, 291 (1991). Research suggests this may
be partially due to whether or not the public was voluntarily exposed or had control over the
exposure to a toxic or hazardous condition. See Brown, supra note 144, at 274 (stating the
public may disagree with level of significance used by experts); W. Granger Morgan,
Choosing and Managing Technology - Induced Risk, in READINGS IN RISK 17, 21
(Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 1990); Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus
Technological Risk, 165 SCi. 1232, 1233-34 (1990).
202 See Cross, supra note 77, at 895; see also Reich, supra note 93, at 1632-34 (discussing
the Ruckelshaus experiment); Ruckelshaus, supra note 94, at 10,190.
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true even if the public understands probabilistic risk.2 °3
Since experts generally rank fears of certain hazards quite differently
from the public2° there is a significant body of literature characterizing
public perception of risk as "irrational. 2 °5 No one can seriously argue that,
to some extent or in some instances, the public will act out of ignorance or
make choices deemed undesirable by experts. That does not mean that the
public's thoughts and preferences can be categorically dismissed, or the
public is in error in some absolute sense. For these reasons, more critical
thought needs to be directed toward the phenomenon of the expert/public
knowledge and information gap. Simply dismissing the public as ignorant
203 See Bray, supra note 132, at 1128-30.
204 See, e.g., Zeckhauser & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 563.
201 See id. "Rational," to the scientific or technical expert means "a mindset that trusts
evidence and the scientific method, appeals to expertise for justification, values universally
and consistency, and considers unspecifiable impacts to be irrelevant to present decision-
making." Hadden, supra note 79, at 49. In contrast, the general public's "rationality,"
generally seen as "irrational" by scientific and technical experts, "appeals to traditional and
peer groups rather than the depersonalized, statistical approach, [and] holds unanticipated
risks to be fully relevant to near-term decision-making, and trusts process rather than
[scientific] evidence." Id. If "[m]odern science is the intellectual endeavor that depends
entirely on the assumption that nature is operating according to general laws hidden but
discernible systematically controlled observation and experimentation ... [then] science
separates that human endeavor from those identified as philosophy, religion, technology, or
magic." Id. It is for this reason that some scientists maintain that their craft is value neutral.
However, as philosophers of science argue, all scientific work is not the search for one all
knowable, pure truth. See id. The process of falsification is based on a set of theoretical
assumptions - assumptions, which in turn, are influenced by personal values. Frank P.
Cross argues that "cognitive limitations, biased information sources, cognitive dissonance,
control, or framing bias" may adversely affect public health by forcing unnecessary
regulation. See Cross, supra note 77, at 950; see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1083
(arguing experts disregard public values as "irrational."). Paul Slovic reported that experts
describe the public as "irrational" and "insane." See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236
ScI. 280, 285 (1983); James Otway, Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy, 7 RISK
ANALYSIS 125, 126 (1987). Similar findings were made by Hadden. See Hadden, supra note
79, at 47-48; EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 210 (V. Covello et al. eds., 1989).
For an extensive discussion of competing views of rationality, see Cantor & Schoepfle, supra
note 152, at 293-96. For an illustrative case study, see Johnson, supra note 182, at 20A.
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or irrational, or embracing the public as omnipotent, are two extreme ends,
both of which would lead to undesirable consequences. Surely, we have
experimented with the expertocracy model and found that wholly
unsatisfactory. Now we may be in the throws of an upswing in the public
participatory model. A summary and review of the literature addressing the
expert/public divide is in order.
Some have characterized the phenomenon of publics rejecting expert
findings, even those about which the public has scientific and mathematical
skills and understanding, as a reflection of the culture clash between
experts,206 on one hand, and the lay public on the other.20 7 Underlying this
culture clash, in many cases, are discordant views about broader social
policy: "Until recently, there has been broad agreement on the overriding
goal for society - to maximize economic growth and the production of
'06 Science is based on "an ability to reason and to investigate natural phenomena
systematically .... [S]cience is not a body of facts so much as it is a way of knowing." Mark
D. Hartwig, Better Testing Key to Better Science Learning, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1989, at
A 16. Experts rely heavily on statistics while the general public does not. Moreover, the
public uses other reasoning. See Brown, supra note 144, at 274. In general, legal truth is
reached through inductive reasoning while scientific truth is garnered by use of deductive
reasoning. See generally PETER SPRENT, TAKING RISKS: THE SCIENCE OF UNCERTAINTY 223
(1.988); see also Lichenstein et al., supra note 8, at 101; Terry F. Ypsie, EPA's Risk
Assessment Culture, 21 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 526, 527 (1987). For a discussion of the
philosophical underpinnings of the so-called culture clash between scientists and non-
scientists see David Geoffrey Holdsworth, Risk Assessment and National Standards:
Philosophical Problems Arising from the Normalization of Risk, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES, supra note 141, at 127.
207 See Brown, supra note 144, at 274. "Scientific literacy has been defined by a coalition
of scientists, teachers, school administrators, and policy analysts as the ability to read with
comprehension news items on science and to be able to apply scientific information to
personal decisions on emerging policy with a basis in science." DOROTHY J. HOWELL,
SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 157 (1992); see also Lazarus, supra note
64, at 363. The clash between experts is traced to C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES: AND A
SECOND LOOK (1964). More recently this has been explored by scientific philosophers
Thomas S. Kuhn, Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, and Imre Lakatos. See generally DAVID
COLLINGRIDGE & COLIN REEVE, SCIENCE SPEAKS TO POWER: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN
POLICY MAKING 8-9 (1986); Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Meta-
Jurisprudence: The Epistemology of Law, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 373, 373-76 (1996).
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goods and services. '  "[T]he various specific values and beliefs on which
environmentalists and industrialists disagree do not each exist isolated and
unsupported, but are embedded in a more or less coherent worldview. 2 °9
20. Cotgrove, supra note 79, at 126. Perhaps the most well-known scholar of the
economic-growth philosophy is Garrett Harden. Harden used formal logic to argue that
waste residuals or externalities are a necessary result of human existence in an open
marketplace. See Garrett Harden, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244
(1968). For an overview of economic literature on environmental policy, see Maureen L.
Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675,
676-77 (1992). For a general discussion of the contemporary problem created by
externalities, see MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 1-6. "Externalities" is a term
used by economists, defined as what arises "when the production of a good or service results
in some costs (like pollution damage) which, in the absence of regulation, are unlikely to be
borne by the producer." Portney, supra note 17, at 8. "A residual is a nonproduct (material
or energy) output, the value of which is less than the costs of collecting, processing, and
transporting it for use." ALLEN V. KNEESE & BLAIR T. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT, 6 n.4 (1979). The belief in continued economic growth is
usually partnered with the belief in the use of natural resources for economic prosperity, see
Szrll, supra note 88, at 214. In the United States, prosperity has been achieved as the result
of mingling community rich natural resources with industrial production consciously linked
with the belief that private property symbolizes achievement or personal wealth. See The
American Political Culture, in THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 12-13 (Richard
Mardiment & Anthony McGrew eds., 1991). Concurrently, private property was believed
by many to be a crucial ingredient to a stable polity. See id. Finally, individualism is joined
with natural resource exploitation and private property as the pillars supporting a worldview
generally antithetical to modem environmentalists. See STONE, supra note 7, at 22-23. Seen
in this light, the clash of more traditionally-based worldviews with contemporary
environmentalists is not surprising. For a good overview of various philosophical
perspectives, see DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, THE SEARCH FOR AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 231-
34 (1990).
209 Portney, supra note 3, at 127. A worldview is a:
constellation of beliefs, values, and concepts that give shape and meaning
to the world a person experiences and acts within. A worldview is not
necessarily a well-developed, systematic philosophy. It can be, but the
worldviews of most people remain simply sets of background assumptions,
often not even recognized by those people, against which they understand
the world and act in it. Individuals often act on unsystemized and
incomplete conceptions, on fragments of worldviews.
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In a quagmire of what may be endless cultures and worldviews, not
to mention the inability of all to understand different cultures and
worldviews, there may be a path to common understanding. Participants in
the decisionmaking process, could begin their deliberations by deciding on
a common vision for their future - their desired end. This would require the
obvious: not excluding relevant players, or devaluing or marginalizing their
concerns because they do not comport with others' worldviews and
cultures.2"' It will require procedural rules providing mechanisms and
incentives for establishing an even playing field for the articulation of diverse
views.2 1 Until we begin to acknowledge these difficult problems, public
participation law will remain little more than a partially fulfilled promise.212
A system of public participation, however, would not ensure that the
final decision conforms to the initial goal or vision. It would, however,
enable a diverse decisionmaking group to start on an equal footing2"3 while
simultaneously addressing an issue common to all participants. A common
goal can be the polestar that leads a group of travelers, some of whom are
guided by compass, some by stars, others by divining rods or intuition.
The debate over the level of ignorance in the general public cannot be
fully explained by a discussion about education and its relation to
worldviews. Exposing culture clashes and proposing procedures to
BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS 75 (1991). Norton
discusses seven worldviews commonly in use. See id. at 187-98; see also TIMOTHY
O'RIORDAN, ENVIRONMENTALISM 300 (2d ed. 1976) (coining the terms "technocentrism" and
"ecocentrism"). There may be endless varieties of culture, as well as worldviews. This is
illustrated by controversial decisions involving diverse groups. Not only are there competing
professional cultures, but also those based on ethnicity. See, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note
148, at 1169; Gerlach, supra note 8, at 275; Elaine Vaughn, The Significance of
Socioeconomic and Ethnic Diversity for the Risk Communication Process, 15 RISK ANALYSIS
169, 169-72 (1995).
20 Cf Poisner, supra note 1, at 56 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Rev-
ival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1576-78 (1988) (deliberation involves community formation of the
common good)).
211 See infra Part III.
212 See infra Part III.
213 This assumes that they are or have acquired the basic science and math skills nec-
essary for intelligent participation in environmental decisionmaking. See infra Part III.
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effectively deal with them must include a discussion of the still-present
weaknesses in public scientific and mathematical training.1 4 Some scholars
have been quite optimistic about the public's ability to grasp and understand
scientific and technical issues.21 5 Others have noted,1 6 that the growing rate
and complexity of technology places demands on public education that may
not be met in the twenty-first century. 2 7 For example, what level of expertise
would a citizen need to discuss the testing and risks associated with "robotics,
automated chemical analysis, remote sensing, catalyst chemistry and
bioremediation? ' 2 8  This question suggests that if we already have not
reached the limits of public participation, we soon will if public education,
knowledge, and scientific and technical progress proceed along historical
patterns.219
Inadequacies in public education, and scientific and technical
advances are but two symptoms of a rapidly transforming world. Perhaps the
most significant change in technology this century has been the development
214 Professor Cross summarized the basic problems with the state of scientific knowledge
in the United States:
The details of statistics and probability are complex and require a high
level of understanding. Unfortunately, many Americans lack even a low
level of understanding of these disciplines. Some Americans even refuse
to accept the concept of probability itself. One significant problem with
risk perception is the serious shortcoming of mathematical and scientific
education in this nation. On an even more fundamental level, a substantial
number of Americans, perhaps 27 million, are too illiterate to even "read
written forms of risk information." Individuals who cannot read or count
are a long distance from the level of understanding necessary to appreciate
risk.
Cross, supra note 77, at 889-90 (citations omitted); see also HOWELL, supra note 207, at 152
("There is a consensus in this country that we suffer not only from scientific illiteracy but also
from a more fundamental general illiteracy.").
215 See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 72, at 3-10.
216 See James Otway, Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy, 7 RISK ANALYSIS
125, 218-20 (1987).
217 American citizens' grasp of science and mathematics generally is lower than members
of other industrialized nations. See Applebome, supra note 196, at Al.
211 See Slants & Trends, supra note 107.
219 See infra Part III.
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of inexpensive, yet powerful personal computers. This has allowed, among
other changes, infinitesimal quantities of data to be stored, retrieved, and
manipulated with relative ease. It is not surprising, then, to read dark
accounts of public misunderstandings over scientific and technical issues.22
2. Risk Communication
Researchers disagree over the cause of the public/expert chasm and
consequently what measures, if any, should be developed in response.
Academics and environmental professionals have given considerable
attention to tweaking the risk communication process.22' This body of
literature suggests that experts should be "nice" to the public, and that
communication should flow between experts and the public, euphemistically
referred to as "two-way communication. '22 There is little disagreement that
the public needs more information, earlier in the decisionmaking process, and
in a form it can understand.223 These suggestions are well taken in their
historical context, but appear to only begin to address problems with current
public environmental decisionmaking.
Even with open and free-flowing communication, lack of education,
conflicting values, and political tug-of-wars remain as fundamental
challenges to a viable decisionmaking process. These weaknesses are
220 See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675,
677-79 (1993).
22 See Fischhoff, supra note 160, at 137; see also E.A.C. Crouch et al., Risk Communicat-
ion: The Need for Incentives, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES, supra
note 141, at 231 (noting the problem of experts' lack of desire to communicate with public
about risk).
222 See 40 C.F.R. § 35.6015 (1996) (asserting that the communication between the agency
and public is "two-way"); RCRA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT MANUEL 2-1 (1993); Cantor &
Schoepfle, supra note 152, at 293-94 (advocating "two-way" risk communication); Lazarus,
supra note 64, at 373 (risk communication should not be a "one-way" street). But see Ellison
Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 206-07
(1991) (criticizing "two-way" communication as political rhetoric).
223 See Bram, supra note 8, at 156-57; Dernbach, supra note 46, at 65; Jones, supra note
30 (forthcoming 1997).
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reflected in the criticism leveled at risk communication by Environmental
Justice theorists. 224  These theorists believe that mainstream risk
communication research supports the status quo of political power and
inequitable distribution of environmental conditions and regulatory
enforcement. 225 Thus, mainstream risk communication, to Environmental
Justice advocates, is designed to sustain and enforce minority or poor
populations' ignorance, or seeming ignorance.226 It also fails to acknowledge
the concerns of Environmental Justice activists. 2 7 Indeed, the entire risk
assessment process has been criticized by some Environmental Justice
224 For a more detailed discussion of the role of equity or justice in environmental dec-
isionmaking, see Roger E. Kasperson, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Community, Firm,
and Government Perspectives, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, HAZARDS:
TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS 139, 140-43 (1986).
25 See Cole, supra note 89, at 646-48 (arguing environmental regulation restricts access
to process by low-income groups); Folk, supra note 222, at 206-07.
26 In introducing the bill for Environmental Justice Act of 1992, then-Senator Al Gore
stated that public health risks disproportionately rest on "those in our society least
empowered, financially and politically, [and]... less likely to know about [environmental
risks] or be able to respond." 138 CONG. REC. S7489 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (remarks of
Senator Gore); see also Cotgrove, supra note 79, at 139 ("[T]he dominant social paradigm
can systematically repress the articulation of alternative viewpoints.").
227 See Poisner, supra note 1, at 63 n.73 (discussing the value of deliberative decision-
making yet noting that racial polarization raises unique concerns for environmental public
processes). Other writers have noted the link between substantive and procedural justice.
See, e.g., Meredith J. Bowers, Note, The Executive's Response to Environmental Injustice:
Executive Order 12,898, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 645, 660 (1995) ("Supporters... believe the order
does not go far enough in creative avenues for public participation.") (citations omitted);
Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters. The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q.
721, 751 (1993) ("Environmental law's process-oriented, public access approach to
environmental decision-making can provide a vehicle to achieve environmental justice.");
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 850-52 (1993) ("serious consideration
should be given to reforming the structure of environmental policymaking so as to enhance
minority access to relevant decisionmaking fora"); Francis Leal, Environmental Injustice, 14
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37, 39 (1994) ("the most damaging and perhaps most obvious causal
factor is that our communities do not have access to the decision-making process for the
siting of risk-laden projects").
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advocates 228 and others.229 At this stage, what can be concluded about the
research relevant to expert/public divide? In the absence of re-establishing
public credibility,23 abandoning the notion of public participation will not gel
with American political culture, particularly given public skepticism over
elected officials, bureaucrats, and experts.23' Americans' focus remains fixed
on large-scale, often unpredicted catastrophes.23 2 Images of Love Canal,233
228 See Kuehn, supra note 22, at 116-29. Cf. DOWIE, supra note 17, at 121-22 (arguing
against validity of risk assessment, questioning moral soundness and inability of risk
assessment to account for cumulative effects).
229 See, e.g., Shere, supra note 4, at 414; P. Merrell & C. Van Strum, Negligible Risk:
Premeditated Murder, 1990 J. PESTICIDE REFORM 10, 10-11 (describing risk assessment as
pre-meditated murder).
230 One of the most notorious examples of problems with agency credibility is the Depart-
ment of Energy, particularly its efforts to cleanup nuclear weapons waste facilities. See
Prepared Statement of Richard J. Guimond, Rear Admiral, Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy Before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Environment of the Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives,
February 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6621870.
231 See, e.g., Fiorino, supra note 138, at 528-30.
232 See Hadden, supra note 79, at 54 (citing examples of technologies and facilities proved
unsafe). But see PETER MENELL & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
420-22 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 266 (1996) (explaining that exaggerated or select media
coverage may result in skewed policy decisions) (citing Michael R. Greenberg et al., Network
Evening News Coverage of Environmental Risk, 9 RISKANALYSIS 119, 125 (1989)); see also
Esty, supra note 8, at 649 (concluding that media coverage focuses on federal environmental
issues, neglecting state ones); Zeckhauser & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 560 (criticizing the
public's response to high-visibility events posing as high a risk as other unrecognized or
underestimated activities or events).
233 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 13, at 3-7; William D. Knox, Comment, Reg-
ulatory Reform: The Present Viability of Risk Assessment, 3 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 49, 50-51
(1996); Adelaine G. Levine, Love Canal and the Limits of Scientific Proof, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 21, 24 (1987).
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Bhopa 234 Three Mile Island,235 Chernobyl,236 and the Exxon Valdez spill237
share an inauspicious place in American environmental history, representing
to the public unexplainable death and technology out-of-control, resulting in
fear and anger.238 To the extent the public can be educated and can reach
agreement with the scientific or official view of an environmental issue, more
stable and politically-viable decisions may follow.239 Conversely, public
input based on personal values, worldviews, or culture, may guide experts
when they shape their research. Of particular concern, the public may force
experts to consider equity, and potential catastrophic consequences, although
such consequences may be statistically unlikely. In short, education coupled
with one means of delivering education - risk communication - are
necessary to meet the demands of an effective public participation program.
D. Should Risk Assessment be Abandoned?
The risk communication process needs improvement, and the
criticisms described above are thought-provoking. There remains, however,
a need to include the public in environmental decisionmaking, for public
education, and the use of quantitative risk assessment in American
234 See Sheila Jasanoff, The Bhopal Disaster and the Right to Know, 27 SOc. SCd. & MED.
1113, 1113 n.3 (1988).
235 See DOWIE, supra note 17, at 129.
236 See Howard Kunreuther & Robert Patrick, Managing the Risks of Hazardous Waste,
33 ENV'T 12, 15 (1991) ("Chemophobia has gripped society."); see also Robert S. Boyd,
Nuclear Waste Disposal Woes Mushroom, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 16, 1995, at A6.
237 See Miller & Keller, supra note 3, at 41.
231 The phenomenon of the public focusing on large-scale environmental tragedy as a pre-
dictor of likely and undesirable future events has been characterized as the "social
amplification of risk." Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A
Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 182 (1988); cf Feller & Maharik, supra note
78, at 310 ("A severe conflict may arise if, following an accident, the public is confronted
with an indefensible decision process on issues involving imposed risk.").
239 See Jones, supra note 30 (forthcoming).
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environmental decisionmaking.2 4° Abandoning risk assessment seems an
unlikely prospect.2 4' The need to quantify, compare, and contrast is
important in a technologically-sensitive society competing for limited
resources.2 41 Risk assessment attempts to deal with the problem of scientific
uncertainty in an age of significant public concern over health effects
associated with the natural environment and its changes. 43 One should also
be mindful of the state of environmental evaluations prior to the use of risk
assessment. "Before th[e] ascendancy of risk assessment as a
decisionmaking tool, when a spill of a pollutant occurred, a government
agency often simply told a responsible party to remove the pollutant."' 44
Risk assessment provides us with a tool to analyze risk; 45 it does not,
240 Compare Stuart L. Deutsch, Setting Priorities: Principles to Improve Environmental
Policy, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 45, 46 (1992) (advocating use of risk assessment), with Shere,
supra note 4, at 414 ("The hard fact is that quantitative risk assessment generates numbers
that are meaningless.").
24! Mark Eliot Shere chronicles the recent history of risk assessment, reviewing legislative
initiatives aimed at codifying its usage. See Shere, supra note 4, at 410-12; see also Exec.
Order No. 12,866, supra note 4; Applegate, supra note 2, at 1647-49; see, e.g., Risk
Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, 141 CONG. REC. H2234-03, H2372.
242 See Testimony of Robert Varney, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of
the Environmental Services on Behalf of the National Governors' Association, available in
1996 WL 10163073 (recounting value of risk assessment as a tool in environmental
decisionmaking). Cost/benefit analysis is required for all major rulemaking. See Exec. Order
No. 12,866, supra note 4 (stating that agencies must consider costs and benefits for adoption
of significant regulation).
243 See Junius C. McElveen, Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1553, 1579 (1995); Ruckelshaus, supra note 94, at 10,190.
244 Brown, supra note 69, at 182.
245 Professor John Graham finds support for risk assessment among lay Americans:
Public opinion research ... suggests widespread public sympathy for the
use of risk analysis in the setting of governmental priorities .... While
the public may not be able to understand the nuances of technically
sophisticated risk assessment, they still show a strong interest in the tools
because they are concerned about the large numbers of health, safety, and
environmental dangers we face, the daunting task of prioritizing them, and
the large costs of ameliorating them.
Graham, supra note 4, at 398-99 (citation omitted).
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however, have to be the final arbiter, nor is it impermeable to modification
and refinement.
Since risk assessment is neither a purely scientific nor a mechanical
exercise in probability calculations, an improvement would be to include
public "say" in the risk assessment process. Moreover, of all the opinions
covering public participation, few, indeed perhaps none, advocate abolishing
public participation. 246 That is not to trivialize the on-going debates over
public participation, since there is a wide range in the quality-level of various
forms of public participation currently being proposed. But the reason the
debate concerns issues of much and whom, instead of none or whether, rests
on American political culture demanding participatory democracy, including
legitimate processes and legitimate public decisions.
III. REALIGNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 247 WITH PEOPLE AND
POLITICS
241
A. Suggestions for Reform
The political appeal of public participation-rights2 49 makes it likely
that the language will continue to make at least a cameo appearance in
environmental legislation. Heretofore, the public participation proposals
have received limited attention, yet the issues underlying public participation
are fundamental to American democracy and worthy of more reflective
246 See Pierre Andr6 et al., Hazardous Waste Management and Community Involvement
in Canada: The Case of Montreal's Rural-Urban Fringe, 15 ENVIRONMENTALIST 170, 171
(1995) (citing American authorities agreeing to the need for community involvement).
247 Technology may be defined as "those specialized industrial, mechanical, electronic, or
chemical processes that go into producing objects, gadgets, goodies, and physical necessities
our society has decided it needs." THOMAS MORE HO3AN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS,
GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COURTS 56 (1987).
241 "[1]f we think [the people] not enlightened enough to exercise their control with
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion."
Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in JAMES L. CREIGHTON, THE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT MANUAL
15(1981).
249 See LARRY S. LUTON, THE POLITICS OF GARBAGE 193 (1996).
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consideration. Merely including public participation language because it has
broad appeal and is politically expedient is not justifiable. In so doing,
political power may be reconfigured. Decisions over uses and abuses of the
natural environment, and in turn risks to human health, are at stake."' Below
is a discussion of some options for modifying the current course of
congressional legislation. It is not exhaustive; it is, however, intended to
invite discourse about America's increasing demand for public
participation.25'
1. Towards a Public Participation Act
While the APA is our model for public participation, it was not
designed to meet contemporary needs for public environmental
decisionmaking. At the time the announce and defend/notice and comment
features were enacted,252 they were considered quite progressive.253 Prior to
this, guaranteed participation rights were largely limited to voting. Town
meetings were also used for citizen involvement, although their value
250 Political theorists continue the debate over the benefits of fractionalizing political power
and the role of political leadership. Some have suggested that "muddling through" is not to
be discouraged, but heralded as an important aspect of American democracy. See, e.g.,
Teuber, supra note 69, at 247 (1991). But see James E. Krier, Round Table Discussion:
Science, Environment, and the Law, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 356, 359 (1994) (muddling through
may result in poor or risky decisions). For the classic "muddling through" texts, see
generally Charles Lindbloom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79(1959); Charles Lindbloom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 517
(1979).
25 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 46 (discussing communities requesting enhanced
public participation); Johnson, supra note 22, at 600-02 (calling for enhanced public
participation under NEPA and state revisions); Rosenbloom, supra note 29, at 26 (discussing
the democratization of the administration process).
252 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1946).
253 See Rosenbloom, supra note 29, at 17.
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substantially decreased with the creation of the administrative bureaucracy.254
In response to the public's "lock-out" from the administrative process, the
freedom of information 255 and open meetings provisions 256 of the APA were
passed into law.
Times have changed. The public once again is locked out. Most
significantly, crucial events occur prior to a decision that legally requires
public input.257  Because significant events occur prior to public
announcement, both the APA and other environmental laws do not provide
an adequate means for the public to be a player in the decisionmaking
process. Post hoc public involvement presents questions about the legitimacy
of decisions reached in the absence of public input and support. With little
debate, the APA approach, or an even more conservative one, was repeated
in the public participation provisions of substantive environmental laws.258
Moreover, efforts to expand public participation are haphazard or
administered as a matter of agency policy.259 Policy and guidance are not
legally enforceable.26°
25 See Frug, supra note 86, at 529-31; cf Esty, supra note 8, at 648 ("Images of spirited
New England town meetings where well-informed citizens debate the destiny of their
community bear little resemblance to today's state and local decisionmaking in general or
environmental policymaking in particular.").
255 The Freedom of Information Act ("FOLA") amended § 552 of the APA, effective July
4, 1967; see infra note 256.
256 The Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 amended § 552(b) of the APA, which
amended 552(b)(3) of FOIA.
257 See generally Johnson, supra note 22, at 569-77.
258 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Department of the Navy Environmental Justice Program, Department of the
Navy Environmental Homepage, last modified July 11, 1995, <http://www.enviro.navy.mil>.
260 For example, although Executive Order No. 12,898 requires enhanced public partici-
pation in order to further Environmental Justice, agencies may not be following its directive
see supra note 22. Wigley and Shrader-Frechette discuss the siting of a uranium enrichment
facility located in two African-American communities. "EIS Investigators did not solicit
opinion leaders from these two towns. Instead, assessors canvassed leaders from
Homer... [,]" approximately fifty-three percent white. See Wigley & Shrader-Frechette,
supra note 4, at 65.
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At the same time, environmental decisionmaking, and risk assessment
in particular, has become exponentially more complicated. We are growing
increasingly aware of the complexities posed by uncertainties in science,2 61
by philosophical debates, such as concerns for prospective generations,262 the
rights of minorities or indigenous peoples,2 63 and by new discoveries or
characterizations of environmental degradation, such as Brownfields2" or
concerns associated with biodiversity.2 65 The notice and comment process,
which promoted or supported the decide-announce-defend decisionmaking,
is simply an inappropriate political institution for contemporary
environmental issues. Congress should consider the currently existing
patchwork approach to public participation.2 66 Uniform public participation
provisions would promote stability and fairness in all decisions relevant to
risk. Specific terms would include those discussed below.
261 See Shere, supra note 4, at 474-75.
262 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 29, at 27. One of the first thorough discussions of future
generations is found in JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 115-186 (1982).263 See Poisner, supra note 1, at 63, n.73 (discussing the value of deliberative decision-
making yet noting that racial polarization raises unique concerns for environmental public
processes). Other writers have noted the link between substantive and procedural justice.
See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 227, at 660 ("Supporters... believe that the order [Executive
Order No. 12,898] does not go far enough in creative avenues for public participation .... )
(citations omitted); Foster, supra note 227, at 751 ("Environmental law's process-oriented,
public access approach to environmental decisionmaking can provide a vehicle to achieve
environmental justice."); Lazarus, supra note 227, at 850 ("[S]erious consideration should
be given to reforming the structure of environmental policymaking so as to enhance minority
access to relevant decisionmaking fora."); Leal, supra note 227, at 39 ("[T]he most damaging
and perhaps the most obvious causal factor is that our communities do not have access to the
decision-making process for the siting of risk-laden projects.").
264 For a general overview of the Brownfields issue, see CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH
COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 1-30
(1997).
263 See generally Richard J. Blaustein, Biodiversity and the Law, 26 ENVTL. L. 1313, 1313-
17 (1996) (book review).
266 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
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2. Consider the Public Participation Requirements in the Context of
American Democracy
In order to craft new public participation law, one might contemplate
the role of public participation in democratic theory.267 Are stakeholders
engaged in an exercise of direct democracy,268 participatory democracy, 269
representative democracy,27° or deliberative democracy?21 Deliberative and
participatory democracy are promoted when public participation uses
consensus-building procedures or co-opting techniques. Public participation
has been viewed as a form of representative democracy; 272 that is, those who
participate in the process are seen as guardians of the environmental values
267 At least one scholar has used another term, "administrative democracy." See Frug,
supra note 86, at 519.
268 See generally Citrin, supra note 75, at 268 (discussing the benefits of direct dem-
ocracy).
269 See generally BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 166 (1983); DELLI
CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 108, at 31-49.
270 Mansbridge identifies what I call "representative democracy" as adversary democracy:
"electoral representation, majority rule, and one citizen/one-vote is democracy .... I... call
[]it 'adversary' democracy." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 81, at 1 (1980).
27 For a philosophical analysis, see BOHMAN, supra note 94, at 4-9; CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 36-44 (1996).
272 As stated by Professor Stewart:
Broad participation rights do not, by any means, ensure that all relevant
interests will be represented before the agencies. Representation of these
interests is especially unlikely in what may be a frequent situation in
administrative law - where the impact of a decision is widely diffused so
that no single individual is harmed sufficiently to have an incentive to
undertake litigation, and where high transaction costs and the collective
nature of the benefit sought preclude a joint litigation effort, even though
the aggregate stake of the affected individuals would justify it. 'Public
interest' advocacy is aimed at providing representation for such widely
scattered interests . . . . "Public interest" advocates, however, do not
represent - and do not claim to represent - the interests of the
community as a whole.
Stewart, supra note 81, at 1763-64 (citations omitted).
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of the public at large.173  Public participation in environmental
decisionmaking has not been a form of direct democracy, as ultimate
decisionmaking power has resided with bureaucrats and elected
representatives.
Increasingly, public participation through the form of Citizen
Advisory Boards ("CABs") is seen as an institution of representative
democracy.2 74 But members do not necessarily reflect the demographics of
a given area. Members are not chosen by the populace, nor are they
responsible or responsive to them. 75 Moreover, to the extent CABs rule by
majoritarian vote, they may run antithetical to minority interests. 76 This
raises particular concern if the public participation process is dominated by
socio-economically advantaged and formally-educated citizens.277 CABs are,
in the end, just a mechanism to gauge public sentiment and support for the
implementation of federally-prescribed law on a localized level. They should
not have definitive authority, nor serve as a substitute for fuller, more direct
and diverse public participation. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that
.73 See, e.g., Brain, supra note 8, at 153-56. Interest group representation is not without
its critics. See GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 342-52
(1966) (explaining that interest groups can be exclusionary and non-representative of
demographic diversity).
274 See Fiorino, supra note 7, at 235 (1990). Frances Lynn and George J. Busenberg have
summarized much of the literature focusing on citizen advisory groups. See Frances M. Lynn
& George J. Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Committees and Environmental Policy: What We
Know, What's Left to Discover, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 147, 147-49 (1995).
275 At least one scholar has suggested that CABs should be chosen randomly, similar to the
way juries are impaneled. See Cross, supra note 77, at 956. To this author's knowledge, this
suggestion has never been put into practice.
276 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 505-06 (1987) (stating that disadvantaged groups have enhanced difficulties
participating in government) (citations omitted); Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental
Racism: A Citizen 's Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366, 391 (1992) ("[T]he majoritarian process has frequently failed to
protect racial minorities and the poor from the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites.")
(citations omitted). For the traditional theory, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)
(discussing the tyranny of majority).
277 See Goodenough, supra note 7, at 287-98 (1995) (citing Stuart Langton, supra note 7,
at 28-29).
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CABs are not going to be susceptible to "capture" in much the same way
agencies have been.27 In short, CABs add another layer of bureaucracy
between the public and official decisionmakers. In this sense, CABs may
serve to limit public participation, functioning as a gatekeeper and filter, and
as a fifth, or even sixth, branch of government.27 9
3. Debate the Power Allocations Created by Public Participation Language
The public will not participate in deliberative, consensus-building
politics if they are not truly empowered in the process.20  The public's
concerns, however, may find other alternatives for political expression.28'
Americans simply reject authoritarian environmental decisionmaking.2 s2 This
has been repeatedly documented in literature noting how involuntariness,
perceived arbitrariness, and exclusionary processes engender public
skepticism and even outrage about environmental decisions. 23 Rather than
excluding the general populace by setting-up CABs or including standing
provisions as a prerequisite to public participation, agencies should have an
affirmative duty to seek out public input. As an initial step, agencies should
be required to understand the general demographics of the community that
hosts the environmental facility or phenomenon at issue. Agencies should
278 "Capture" refers to "the phenomenon whereby ... agency officials serve[ ] the interests
of extractive industries rather than the conservation guidelines of the statutes." Futrell, supra
note 7, at 93. See Guruswamy, supra note 11, at 482; Stewart, supra note 81, at 1713
(interest groups are comparatively over-represented in public participation processes). See
generally Michael C. Blumm, Public Lands. The Case Against Transferring BLM Lands to
the States, NRLI NEWS (Winter 1995) at 13 (interest groups often dominate decisionmaking
process). But see Regens & Rycroft, supra note 83, at 424 (criticizing capture literature).
279 Agencies have frequently been referred to as the fourth branch of government. See,
e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 29, at 10. Scientific Advisory Boards have been described as
the "fifth branch." See JASANOFF, supra note 72.
280 See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059,
1070 (1980) (discussing community decisionmaking in general terms).
2' See supra note 79.
282 See supra note 11.
213 See supra note 149.
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also be charged with creating public participation plans that are tailored to all
sectors of the community. These should extend beyond notice and include
sponsorship of informational meetings. Interviews, questionnaires, focus
groups, tours, small-group discussions, and educational seminars are among
the variety of public participation mechanisms to be considered.28 4
Videotapes and written materials in appropriate languages285 should be
considered as well as facilitators sensitive to local communities.8 6 In the
case of African-American communities, working in concert with an
Historically Black College or University ("HBCU") has been
recommended.287
4. Fund Educational Programs
In any agency relationship, agents with more complete
knowledge are in a position to take advantage of the person
for whom they are acting. Indeed, the only condition under
which citizens could fully rely on their regulatory agents to
act in their best interest would be if regulators were pure
altruists and citizens were in agreement about the appropriate
degree of protection that regulators should seek with respect
284 Many of these suggestions appear in agency guidance documents. See, e.g., RCRA
COMMUNITY RELATIONS HANDBOOK; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (May 24, 1996).
285 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 601-02 (advocating use of Spanish-language documents
where needed by locally-affected communities) (citations omitted).
.86 See generally Cole, supra note 89, at 619 n.264. On commenting on communication
between lawyers and poor communities, Attorney Cole notes that in order to empower local
communities attorneys should "determin[e] culturally appropriate and logistically convenient
times for meetings, as well as holding the meeting on turf both familiar and comfortable to
the participants." Id. These suggestions have equal force in the context of environmental
decisionmaking.
287 See Department of the Navy Environmental Justice Program, supra note 259.
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to every source of risk.288
Similarly those who are subject to regulation289 and interest groups may have
an advantage in the public participation process.2 90 Leveling the playing field
requires public education.
Sensitization alone will not close the gap between experts and
laypersons. The general public is woefully under-educated, 291 making its
ability to understand the risk assessment process an exclusive club for both
experts and those in the minority of Americans who have attained adequate
levels of scientific and technical expertise.292 Risk assessment relies heavily
on statistical evidence, probability testing, and conclusions.293 Assuming
America continues to work from this problematic paradigm, 294 scientific and
other technical knowledge and skills will have premium value and will be
crucial to engaging in environmental decisionmaking.295 Contemporary bills
advocating more public participation overlook this nicety; without public
education, public participation rights are vacuous promises, or serve to
288 Noll, supra note 110, at 174; cf. Sunstein, supra note 276, at 447 (stating that
"agencies... [are] likely to act in their own interests," including enhancing administrator
power, and are subject to interest-group capture) (citations omitted).
289 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY 205-06 (1994); Brown, supra note 69, at 196.
290 See supra note 273.
291 See supra notes 193-220.
292 See GERRARD, supra note 7, at 130-3 1.
293 See Cross, supra note 77, at 888-89; William R. Freudenburg, Perceived Risk, Real
Risk: Social Science and the Art of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 242 SCI. 44, 44-46
(1988); Peter Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 14-18 (1993). But see Sheila Jasanoff, Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment
in Britain and the United States, in SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 36, 45
(B.B. Johnson & V.T. Covello eds., 1987) (arguing that environmental decisionmaking is
less dependent upon probabilities in Great Britain).
294 See supra Part II.
295 For a more in-depth analysis of the need for public education, see supra, Part II.
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enhance the power of educated elites.296
Of paramount importance is statistics training. The cry for science
and mathematical education in secondary, high school, and at higher levels
of education is well-known.29 7  At the core of most environmental
decisionmaking is probabilistic thinking. By one estimate, about half of the
bills in Congress include significant scientific or technological
components.29 Consideration should be given to creating community-based
environmental education centers. Corporate America,299 as well as
universities,"' have been engaged in environmental projects of this nature
with promising results. To that end, Congress should continue its support of
grants to communities so that they can better equip citizens to participate
intelligently in environmental decisions, as well as consider individual
lifestyle issues relevant to human health.30 ' Education not only facilitates
dialogue and bridges the gap between experts and the public, but may also
serve to modify expectations about pollution control, environmental
degradation, and remediation. 02
296 Some scholars think that some forms of public participation can be undemocratic. See
Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Regulation and Democratic Process: A Critical Review,
14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 527, 534 (1989). Scholars also research the correlation
between political participation generally and socioeconomic status. See, e.g., Cupps, supra
note 151 at 480; Rosenbaum, supra note 151, at 355-57.
297 See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.
298 See Gerald Holton, Where is Science Taking Us?, in POLITICS FOR THE PEOPLE:
FINDING A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC VOICE 10 (David Mathews ed., 1994).
299 See, e.g., Joan Bemer & Cynthia Ames, Abstract, An Approach to Managing Public
Interactions for a Chemical Waste Incinerator, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
INCINERATION AND THERMAL TREATMENT TECHNOLOGIES, May 6-10, 1996, at 21.
"0 See Richard E. Sclove, Putting Science to Work in Communities, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER ED., May 31, 1995, at B l-B2.
30 Technical assistance grants ("TAGs") were added to CERCLA by the 1986 amend-
ments in section 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (1994); 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.4000-.4130 (1996).
At least one scholar has suggested that TAGs be extended to citizens involved with
environmental problems other than those covered by Superfund. See Johnson, supra note
22, at 600-01.
302 See Lazarus, supra note 64, at 364, 372-73.
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5. Include Explicit Requirements for Early and Meaningful Public
Participation
Participation at each stage of the risk assessment process should be
mandatory. Environmental statutes do not guarantee early public
participation.0 3 The stage at which the public has a legal right to impact
environmental decisions must be moved back in time.30 4 In general, the
public is excluded from the scoping stage, i.e., when what will be studied is
determined. The public remains excluded during the study design, data
collection, and data analysis. This is shown poignantly in RCRA and
CERCLA. The publics must have a legally enforceable right to participate
as early as there is governmental action. This requires explicit requirements,
not leaving it to agencies to attempt haphazardly public participation
programs under regulations and regulatory guidance such as handbooks. It
also means that the right to participate be enforceable at the time there is a
violation of the public participation law.
6. Disclose Limitations Imposed by Sophisticated Scientific Issues
Scientific issues may be sophisticated for a number of reasons:
scientific uncertainty, education, knowledge, or expertise required to
understand the issue in question, or because it involves embedded or
contentious value judgements. All of these should be openly and honestly
disclosed. If an issue requires high levels of formal education, the
assumption is that public education will not be sufficient to enable the public
to participate actively. If they have not already done so, Americans should
contemplate whether a decline in education, coupled with a rise in technology
necessitates for some issues to be left in the hands of experts.
303 See, e.g., EPA Efforts to Involve Citizens Called More P.R. Than Substance, supra note
97 (calling for mandated early citizen participation at crucial decisionmaking stages).
.04 See Bray, supra note 132, at 1137 ("Citizens affected by agency action often bring
scientific information too late in the decision-making process to influence agency decisions.
Public meetings are often scheduled too late in the decision-making process for citizens to
influence risk assessment regulations.").
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If this is the case, a proven track record of reliability, an explanation
as to why the issue is beyond the pale of lay understanding, and an expert, or
experts, who comes from, understands or represents all sectors of public
sentiment, is in order. Post hoc rationalizations for involuntarily exposed
publics have created a record of discord and dissatisfaction. Sophisticated
questions arising from scientific uncertainty require public disclosure, debate
and dialogue, and consensus that, in fact, the scientific or technical aspects,
are of that nature. In this limited context, the public must, through delegation
manifested in the form of a relationship built on trust, defer to expertise in
decisionmaking. If delegation is required, it must be freely given after full
disclosure; consent must be meaningful, not chimerical." 5
To critics of a system in which a small portion of decisions are
reserved to experts, this proposal offers one crucial change to the status quo.
Today, even under systems with open, informative public participation, there
remain decisions which are left in the hands of experts exclusively. Or, the
public may be satisfied about a risk decision in which it participated and feel
satisfied with the result, even if the decision is not wise from a scientific
perspective. Simply reaching a socially acceptable decision is not good
enough.30 6 In the modification suggested here, the public is empowered to
concede its decisionmaking power to experts through an overt and conscious
process. Implicit within the disclosure is a justification. This, in turn, will
tend to mitigate against the possibility of deferral to experts on inappropriate
occasions such as when "tough" decisions need to be made based on a choice
among competing values, equity, anthropological presumptions or scientific
uncertainty.
At the same time, agencies may in fact be deferring to uninformed
public sentiment. This proposal is designed to disclose this fault as well.
Considering how sophisticated an issue is will tend to tease out lack of public
305 Cf SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 4, at 214 (risk must be freely undertaken); Starr,
supra note 201, at 1235, 1237 (arguing that the public is less willing to accept involuntary
risks than voluntary).
" Many public participation proponents believe that public participation is successful if
viable decisions are reached after the public accepts the decision voluntarily. See, e.g.,
SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 4, at 209.
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education or expertise as well as equity considerations. American political
culture can tolerate a limited degree of deferral to expertise. Americans have
been willing to trust officials in times of national emergency or in cases of
credible national security claims. Individually Americans listen to experts on
a daily basis - to lawyers, accountants, insurance agents, and physicians.
Certainly trust is a key ingredient between professionals and their clients.
Similarly, disclosure and debate as to whether an issue is sophisticated, and
thereby reserved for expert decisionmaking, is designed to engender trust,
accountability and reliability.
B. A Critique of Anti-Public Participation Proponents
There are scholars advocating restrictions on public participation. °7
Public participation may be costly from an economist's viewpoint." 8
Regulators should ignore public sentiment, these scholars argue, which is
grounded in "cognitive limitations, biased information sources, cognitive
dissidence, control, or framing bias."309 Some advocate rejecting public
concern that a decision is morally repugnant because it involves the potential
307 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 55-81 (1993) (arguing that
a professional bureaucracy should make public environmental decisions); Paul J. Culhane,
NEPA 's Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 681,
682-84 (1990); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278-79 (1985); O'Brien, supra note
120, at 105 ("Expansion of public participation ... frustrates rather than enhances
administrative fact finding and decisionmaking."). See generally David Dickson, Limiting
Democracy: Technocrats and the Liberal State, I DEMOCRACY 61, 66-69 (1981)
(identifying critics of public participation); cf. WILLIAM OPHULS & STEPHEN BOYAN, JR.,
ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 159-63 (1977) (suggesting that elite-based
decisionmaking would be advantageous in an age of scarce natural resources).
308 See, e.g., Zeckhauser & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 559.
3' Lichenstein et al., supra note 8, at 93; see Cross, supra note 77, at 950 ("A variety of
measures could be taken to facilitate the government's use of scientifically accurate measures
of risk rather than mistaken public perceptions. Foremost is the reduction in opportunities
for public participation in decisionmaking.").
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loss of life, even the low probability of loss of life.31° This is risky.
Depending on the salience of the public's sentiment and its ability to amass
power and put this power into action, the viability of forcing an unacceptable
decision is called into question.31 ' Because of this threat, mediatory 32 and
deliberative3"3 modes of political expression exist.
If only we had Philosopher Kings,314 perhaps these opinions would
have more practical application. Research is needed to resolve fundamental
questions about public participation: why, how, and to what extent do we
include the public and their sentiments in the environmental decisionmaking
process? But re-packaging the scientific community's belief that non-
probability thoughts should be marginalized merely restates what has been
reported previously, providing scant insight into how to respond to the
demands of American political culture. The desire for open participatory
politics, compensation in the face of injury, fair decisionmaking processes
and outcomes acceptable to host communities, including concerns over
Environmental Justice,3' 5 are just part of our environmental challenge for the
next century. Those who advocate restricted public participation in risk
assessment should pause to consider the state of the environment in non-
democratic or recently non-democratic countries. Authoritarian regimes
where perhaps errant, rogue, or misguided "Philosopher-Kings" have held
exclusive decisionmaking power, have lead their nations on a path to
310 See, e.g., Lichenstein et al., supra note 8, at 95-96. But see Taurek, supra note 201, at
306-12 (discussing the philosophy underlying decisionmaking focusing on quantity of lives
lost).
311 As argued by Professor Finkel, expert decisionmaking runs the risk of proving anti-
democratic. See Finkel, supra note 139, at 356-57.
312 For a discussion of public participation as a form of mediation, see Sassaman, supra
note 68, at 215-21.
313 See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
314 See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, PART III 175-256 (Francis M. Comford trans., 1945).
3 15 See supra note 22.
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environmental Armageddon. 16
CONCLUSION
Tensions between the empowered and less powerful, and between
experts and various publics holding differing degrees of political clout,
expose the state of education and politics in this country. Thinking processes
and professional cultures are attached to relative levels of formal education.
Legislative efforts can ill afford to mask the realities of disparities in
knowledge and political demands; yet these disparities exist within a limited
universe, restricted by time, resources, and feasibility of implementation or
accommodation. Law and our political and legal institutions should be
designed for optimal public decisionmaking.
On the cusp of the millennium, America is in a unique position." 7
Other nations, both individually and in regional units, are poised to follow its
experiences with public involvement" 8 as well as risk assessment." 9 Our
models should chart the course well.32° To date, academics from diverse
disciplines have by-and-large spoken past or around each other or have dealt
with a discrete aspect of a much larger issue - public say about perhaps the
most essential public good - the natural environment. It is hoped that this
31 See Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATL. MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44; Robert C.
Paehlke, Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next Century, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s, supra note 17, at 361-64; cf Sz6ll, supra note 88,
at 222 (stating that the economic system of authoritarian or recently authoritarian regimes
demands less environmental protection and prevention).
317 See Jasanoff, supra note 11, at 62-63.
38 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT 4-18 (1992); KATHRYN HARRISON & GEORGE HOBERG, RISK, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS 184 (1994) (increasing demands for public participation in Canada). See generally
David A. Wirth, Participation and Litigation Rights of Environmental Associations in
Europe: Current Legal Situation and Practical Experience, 14 MICH. J. INTL. L. 465, 465-
78 (1993) (book review).
"' See Graham, supra note 4, at 386 (citing CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 (1994)).
320 Professor Paehlke notes that American democracy, in contrast to authoritarian regimes,
has supported environmental values. See Paehlke, supra note 316, at 361-64.
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article has highlighted some linkages between the various disciplines of
public health, economics, engineering, epidemiology, toxicology, political
science and law as well as raised some issues that have been less developed
in previous research.
